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Abstract 
 
Obiettivo di questo lavoro è investigare l’effetto di diverse fonti di confronti sociali 
sulla tendenza delle persone a massimizzare i profitti di fronte a situazioni ambigue. 
Sulla base della teoria del confronto sociale (Festinger, 1954), e sviluppati intorno ai 
suoi recenti sviluppi (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002; Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006; 
Garcia & Tor, 2007), tre esperimenti sono stati costruiti con l’obiettivo di manipolare lo 
status sociale dei partecipanti in relazione ad altri simili. A tal fine, si sono confrontate 
due differenti modalità di comunicazione dell’informazione relative allo status sociale. 
L’Esperimento 1 adotta un feedback aggregato, e confronta la tendenza ad approfittare 
di situazione ambigue, ovverosia situazioni nelle quali è possibile scegliere differenti 
ricompense, da parte di partecipanti costantemente sotto e sopra il punteggio medio di 
un gruppo di riferimento. L’Esperimento 2, costruito sulla base dell’esperimento 1, 
adotta invece un feedback relativo (ranking), e confronta il comportamento economico 
di partecipanti sempre in seconda posizione con quello di partecipanti sempre in 
penultima posizione all’interno di un gruppo di altri quattro studenti. Infine, il terzo 
esperimento, mantenendo la stessa struttura dei precedenti, confronta in modo diretto 
feedback aggregato e relativo, andando a paragonare il comportamento economico di 
partecipanti costantemente sopra la media e sempre in prima posizione. Inoltre, 
l’Esperimento 3 testa un possibile mediatore della relazione tra differenti tipi di 
feedback e la tendenza alla massimizzazione dei guadagni. Nel complesso, i risultati 
dimostrano che quando non sono fornite informazioni relative ad altri individui 
specifici, partecipanti sopra la media tendono ad approfittare in misura minore di 
situazioni ambigue rispetto a coloro sotto la media (Esperimento 1). Tuttavia, quando 
sono fornite informazioni più precise e dettagliate in relazione allo status all’interno di 
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un gruppo (ranking), misure di confronto aggregate non vengono più prese in 
considerazione. Partecipanti sempre in seconda e in penultima posizione (Esperimento 
2) e sempre in prima posizione (Esperimento 3), non solo dimostrano di approfittare di 
situazioni ambigue, ma allo stesso tempo infrangono le regole con l’obbiettvo di 
guadagnare una somma di denaro maggiore. Infine, l’Esperimento 3 dimostra che la 
precisione dell’informazione relativa alla posizione nei confronti di altri simili, spiega la 
differente tendenza alla massimizzazione dei profitti tra partecipanti sopra la media e 
sempre in prima posizione. Il contributo di tale lavoro è duplice. Da un lato estende la 
teoria del confronto sociale (Festinger, 1954) e quella sui ranking (Garcia et al., 2006) 
in ambito economico, mostrando come differenti sorgenti di confronto sociale non solo 
promuovono comportamenti competitivi, ma influenzano anche la tendenza ad 
interpretare situazioni economiche ambigue a proprio vantaggio. In secondo luogo, i 
risultati emersi nei tre esperimenti suggeriscono che indentificare la modalità corretta di 
comunicare performances raggiunte rappresenta un fattore delicato, che se utilizzato in 
modo errato può alimentare comportamenti dannosi all’interno di gruppi e 
organizzazioni.    
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Abstract 
 
Goal of this present work is to investigate the effect of different sources of social 
comparison on people’s tendency to maximize their payoff when facing ambiguous 
situations. Based on social comparison processes theory (Festinger, 1954) and on its 
more recent developments (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002; Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 
2006, Garcia & Tor, 2007), three experiments were built with the goal of manipulating 
participants’ social status compared to similar others. To this purpose, I adopted two 
different ways to communicate participants’ information about their standing. 
Experiment 1 adopts aggregate feedback and compares the tendency to take advantage 
of ambiguous situations, namely, scenarios in which it was possible to select among 
different payoffs, between participants scoring consistently above and below the 
average score of a reference group. Building on Experiment 1, Experiment 2 adopts 
relative feedback (ranking), and compares the economic behavior of participants’ 
ranking consistently second-best to that of participants ranking second-last within a 
group of five students. Lastly, Experiment 3, built on the previous two experiments, 
directly compares aggregate and relative feedback among participants ranking above 
the average and always in first position. Furthermore, Experiment 3 tests a possible 
mediator of the relationship between different feedback and participants’ tendency to 
maximize their earnings. To summarize, the results emerged across the three 
experiments demonstrate that when information about specific others’ performance is 
not provided, participants ranking above the average exploit ambiguous situations to a 
lower extent compared to participants scoring below the average (Experiment 1). Yet, 
when precise and detailed information about individuals’ positions within a group is 
specified (ranking), aggregate sources of comparisons are no longer taken into account. 
Participants always in second position and in fourth position (Experiment 2), not only 
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exploited ambiguous trials, but also exhibited unethical behavior to increase their total 
payoff. Lastly, Experiment 3 explains how participants ranking always first and above 
the average differ in their tendency to maximize their earnings. The contribution of this 
work is twofold. On the one hand, it extends literature on social comparisons (Festinger, 
1954) and rankings (Garcia et al., 2006) in the economic domain, showing that different 
source of feedback prompts not only competition but also the exploitation of grey areas. 
On the other hand, the results described in the three experiments suggest that identify 
the correct way to communicate performances is important and represents a delicate 
factor, that if not used appropriately can foster negative behaviors within groups and 
organizations.  
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Introduction 
    
   What are the keys to happiness and well being? Following the results of an 
extensive survey carried out by Cantril in the early '60s, the economist Richard Easterlin 
investigated what people themselves reported when asked what made them happy. 
Despite the broad and open-ended nature of this question, most of the concerns emerged 
showed a similar pattern across different countries and cultures. People named health, 
happy family life, job satisfaction as well as material things among the factors capable 
of affecting happiness (Easterlin, 2004). One of the most mentioned factors was money. 
In particular, people thought that having more money should make them feel better. 
Despite the economic view would support this claim, Easterlin suggested that this 
assumption does not hold true in everyday life (Easterlin, 1974; 1995). The paradox is 
that, if a person's income increases, while everyone else’s stays the same, he would 
actually feel better off compared to other people. Yet, if the same person's income 
stayed the same, while everyone else's would increase, then this person would feel 
worse off, even though his standard of living has not, in fact, changed at all. 
   What is important here, and for the purpose of this work, is that perceived 
wealth does not depend on objective, thus absolute, evaluations. Rather, it depends on 
the comparisons with relevant others (Carlsson, Johnasson-Stenman, & Martinsson, 
2003; Easterlin, 1974, 1995). According to the social comparison processes theory 
(Festinger, 1954), individuals spontaneously and unintentionally (see Gilbert, Gisler, & 
Morris, 1995) compare to similar others on different dimensions. For example, people 
can compare themselves with others on how many friends they have, the neighborhood 
they live in, their average GPA, as well as their material possessions. In modern 
societies, income and personal asset represent a relevant facet of comparison, and allow 
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for individuals’ evaluation of their standing in the social hierarchy (Adams, 1963; 
Messick & Cook, 1983). This is particularly important, given that, higher achievements 
and high status are heavily weighted within groups (Carlsson et al. 2003), and high 
status represents prominence, dominance, and respect (Ivanic, Oversbeck, & Nunes, 
2011). Comparisons with similar others affect and shapes people’s social identities 
(Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 1994), and influence feelings of well-being and 
aspirations (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). These processes have an impact on 
people’s behavior. No one wants to perform or achieve less than someone else and feels 
like a ‘loser’. For instance, a student may decide to take extra classes to increase her 
GPA, a researcher could give up her summer breaks to write a research article and 
increase her publications, or a car seller could work extra time during the weekend to 
sell more and try to be among the top sellers in the company. This motivation to reduce 
the discrepancy between a current status and those of others affects social behaviors as 
well. If a person perceives her wealth as inferior to her colleagues, she can try to explore 
possible solutions to get richer, like reducing her total tax liability, and enjoy a lifestyle 
she could not afford otherwise.  
  Another important repercussion of this effect concerns people’s economic 
behavior over time. Comparisons with others affect aspirations, and research showed 
that people adopt the achievements of others as reference points to set their own goals 
(Rick & Loewenstein, 2008; Zell & Alicke, 2009a; 2009b). Furthermore, research 
showed that relative comparisons, rather than absolute, are more important in affecting 
the perception of one’s standing in the society (Helson, 1964; Parducci, 1968). While an 
individual strives to increase her income, or material possessions, others’ incomes will 
increase as well, as all individuals also endeavor to reach a better status (Anderson, 
Kraus, Galinksy, & Keltner, 2012).  
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  This reasoning is clearly supported by the hedonic treadmill model (Brickman 
& Campbell, 1971), which states that individuals’ effort to increase happiness is 
doomed to failure (Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006). More specifically, the model states 
that people, after reacting to good or bad events, quickly adapt back to neutrality. It 
derives that individuals will continue to pursue happiness and well-being because “they 
incorrectly believe that happiness lies just around the corner in the next goal 
accomplished” (Diener et al., p. 305). It follows that, in the social context, when 
evaluating their possessions, income or achievements, individuals will constantly 
engage in different comparisons as their status increases or decreases over time. Put it 
simply, a person can perceive herself as not too rich within a group of rich people or not 
so poor within a group of poor people. 
  While previous work explored social behaviors such cooperation and 
competition as consequences of social comparisons and people’s perception of their 
standing within a group (Chen, Myers, Kopelman, & Garcia, 2012; Garcia & Tor, 2007; 
Poortvliet, Janssen, Van Yperen, & Van de Vliert, 2009), I aim to explore whether and 
how this applies to the exploitation of economic situations and ethical behaviors, such 
as lying and cheating. This is particularly relevant in our society, where on many 
occasions taking advantage of unclear scenarios helps people to increase their 
achievements and standing among peers. Previous work examined the effect of social 
comparisons on joint profit maximization, where choosing to either cooperate or 
compete affected both participant and rival’s outcome. For example, studies showed 
that participants forgo a significant increase in their status when cooperate would allow 
their rival to surpass them in the social ranking (Garcia & Tor, 2007). My contribution 
extends these findings to the economic domain, in situations in which participants’ 
pursuit of status did not affect others.  
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 The remainder of this work unfolds as follows: chapter one will describe the 
social comparison processes theory (Festinger, 1954). I will also discuss the distinction 
between upward and downward comparisons, as well as their consequences on people’s 
self-enhancement. Chapter two will consider the role of rankings and their 
consequences on behavior. Particular attention will be given to social behaviors as 
cooperation and competition (see Garcia & Tor, 2006) and their practical implications 
on real life contexts. Chapter three will illustrate the relationship between rankings, 
status and their effect of subjective well-being, while chapter four will introduce the 
three experiments on which I build this work, suggesting how research on social 
comparisons and ranking can apply to the study of the pursuit of wealth. The structure, 
the method and the main hypotheses will be presented.   
Chapter five, six and seven will respectively describe the first, the second and the third 
experiment. The general discussion will be presented in chapter eight, as well as an 
analysis of this project limitations and future research required to extend the present 
findings.  
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Chapter 1 
  The Theory of Social Comparison Processes 
   
 The core tenet of the social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), posits that 
individuals have the tendency to evaluate their opinions and abilities. This process is 
important, as it provides information about what a person is capable of and allows for a 
better understanding of her skills. Obtaining this information requires a standard, that is, 
an objective value that serves as comparison. For instance, we can ascertain the validity 
of our opinion by reference to the physical world (Festinger, 1954), or we can infer our 
ability on a math task by comparing our answers to the correct ones.  
However, on many occasions, objective means and benchmarks are not 
available, causing evaluations to be unstable. Evaluating whether a performance is good 
or not could be very difficult. Although individuals can still adopt their self as cognitive 
reference point (Rogers, 1981), for instance by comparing their latter grade in a class to 
their previous, when stable non social means are present, people compare on a specific 
dimension to others. Yet not all the ‘others’ are perceived as equally relevant, and only 
individuals similar to the self represent a reliable source of comparison (Taylor & 
Lobel, 1989).  
 Goethals and Darley (1977) extended this concept, suggesting that more precise 
evaluations occur when the other person possesses similar attributes relevant to the 
dimension of comparison. For example, a student would be more likely to evaluate her 
academic performance by comparing her average GPA to that of others similar in age, 
education and sex. The notion of similarity is linked to another principle of Festinger’s 
theory, which is the discrepancy between the individual and the social target. The 
discrepancy is function of the perceived distance to the relevant other; the more this 
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distance increases, the less the comparison is useful to the self. What outlined so far 
highlighted the cognitive nature of the theory, showing why, how, and with whom 
people compare themself. However, these processes have important behavioral 
implications that will be discussed in the next section.  
 
1.1 Consequences of social comparisons 
 Festinger originally emphasized the need for self-evaluation as the main purpose 
behind his theoretical approach, suggesting the importance of similar others in shaping 
precise and stable judgments about one’s abilities, skills and opinions (Wood, 1989). An 
important implication of this assumption, is that people take actions to reduce the 
discrepancy between themselves and relevant others. These actions, or strategies, have 
different functions: at the intragroup level they favor uniformity in the group, while at 
the intrapersonal level they promote self-improvement and self-enhancement.  
  At the intrapersonal level, work by Atkinson, Raynor, and Birch (1974) and 
Bandura (1986), found that individuals strive to improve their abilities, and research by 
Button, Mathieu, and Zajac (1996) demonstrated that this occurs both with learning 
goals and performance goals (see also Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1994). Another factor that 
pertain to the intrapersonal level is the tendency to protect and enhance people’s self-
esteem (Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; Wilson & Brenner, 1971; Wood, 
1989). Both self-improvement and self-enhancement suggest that the evaluation of 
abilities is not the exclusive factor driving social comparisons, and that the broad range 
of the theory can account for different dynamics of people’s social behavior.   
 One the oftentimes less recognized aspect of the theory, is that less importance 
is given to the environment people live in. Although Festinger (1954) acknowledged the 
role of the context in which comparisons occur, it is important to notice that the social 
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environment can actively affect people’s perception of skills and performance, with 
strong influence on subsequent behavioral responses. Referring to Pettigrew and the 
“campus as a frog pond” effect (Pettigrew, 1967, p. 257), Wood (1989) illustrates that a 
student who received high grades in a college where it is easy to earn high grades will 
tend to have higher aspirations than an equally good student attending a more 
challenging school. Such example is also in line with what was reported at the 
beginning of this work. We must recognize the importance of relative rather than 
absolute benchmarks (see also Marsh & Parker, 1984). This last point is corroborated by 
research on relative deprivation (for a review see Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & 
Baiosiewicz, 2012), which states that people evaluate the satisfaction with their 
outcomes not in absolute terms, but with the relevant standards within a group (Messé, 
& Watts, 1983). Highlighting the behavioral consequences and implications of the 
social comparison theory is pivotal in the present work for two reasons. First, it 
recognizes the importance of the social context, and, more importantly, the dynamic 
environment in which comparisons occur. Second, it allows for a better understanding 
of the effect of relevant others on individuals’ goals. In western societies, being better 
than others is important (Collins, 1996; Festinger, 1954; Taylor & Brown, 1988), 
especially when the comparison occurs on dimensions perceived as salient (Wood, 
1989). Feelings of superiority affect self-esteem (Brown, 1986; Campbell, 1986; Morse 
& Gergen, 1970), well being (Affleck & Tennen, 1991; Crocker & Gallo, 1985, 
Gibbons, 1986), and aspirations (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). Therefore, 
individuals can adopt different strategies when choosing similar others to compare with. 
For example, people can make comparisons with others who are inferior or less 
fortunate than the self, or, on the contrary, they can choose to make comparisons with 
others who are in a better position.  
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 1.2  The direction of social comparison 
 Although sometimes comparisons are forced by the context and by specific 
circumstances (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992), the theory depicts the individual as an active 
agent in choosing whom to compare with (Wood, 1989). More specifically, further 
developments of Festinger’s original formulation suggest that the discrepancy between 
one person and the social target can be construed in different ways. Individuals can 
adopt different strategies to accomplish their goals, be they self-evaluations, self-
enhancements or merely more material goals such as relative income and subjective 
well being among peers (Hagerty, 2000). People can direct their attention either towards 
individuals who are better off, by selecting an upward comparison or, towards 
individuals who are worse off, a downward comparison. 
 
 1.2.1 Upward comparisons 
 Comparisons with others who are better off on a relevant dimension are defined 
upward comparisons. In the early definition of the theory, Festinger (1954) stated that 
the tendency to outperform others was intrinsic in nature, and people constantly 
compared with better others to set goals and higher achievements.  
  Research on upward comparisons led to inconsistent results. Early research 
seems to emphasize positive consequences of upward comparisons. For example, 
Thornton and Arrowood (1966) suggested that they positively affect self-enhancing 
tendencies. In the same year, Wheeler (1966) demonstrated that, after receiving a false 
feedback on a task, participants were permitted to view the score of another participant 
in the same group. A total 87% of their participants chose to view the score of a better 
off individual, and, among these participants, 75% reported their performance to be 
close to the target. Wheeler (1966) concluded that upward comparisons do not represent 
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a threat; rather, they are adopted to confirm that one is among the “best achievers”. A 
few years later, Nosanchuk and Erickson (1985) reported data from 544 professional 
bridge players who were asked with whom of the other players they would like to 
compare in different scenarios. Across eight different situations, participants were more 
likely to compare with superior targets, thus corroborating the assumption of a 
spontaneous disposition toward upward comparisons.  
 On the other hand, further developments of the theory revealed negative side 
effects of upward comparisons. Morse and Gergen (1970) showed that participants 
waiting for a job interview reported a lower level of self-esteem when the other 
candidate in the room was well kempt and competent (Morse & Gergen, 1970), and 
higher self esteem when the candidate looked dirty and was wearing smelly clothes. 
Past research has also highlighted the drawback of comparing with others who are better 
off, since such comparisons are considered painful for people’s self-concept (Gibbons, 
1986; Major, Schiaccitano, & Crocker, 1983; Wheeler, & Miyake, 1992).  
 However, there are circumstances under which people may actually benefit from 
these comparisons. For instance, a woman following a diet can hang pictures of skinnier 
persons on the fridge, as a guide to healthier eating and lifestyle (Helgeson & Taylor, 
1993), or a soccer player can be inspired by his favorite professional athlete without 
perceiving any threat.  
 
 1.2.2 The construction of upward comparisons 
 What outlined above revealed an inconsistent pattern of results concerning the 
effect of upward comparisons. Early theorists argue for their positive effect on self-
enhancement and in boosting aspirations and self esteem, while more recently, scholars 
highlighted their ego-deflating functions. Collins (1996) integrated these different areas 
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of research, suggesting when and how others who are better off lead to positive 
consequences for the self.  
 For instance, Helgeson and Taylor (1993) provided an example that clarifies this 
concept. The picture of a skinnier model on the fridge can either instill aspirations and 
positive feelings or represent a threat to the self. What leads to one result or the other? 
Collins (1996) suggested that the way people construe different comparisons affect the 
impact that the comparison itself could have on the individual. The focus here is on the 
cognitive dimension of social comparisons, and on individuals’ expectations (Collins, 
1996). In recalling the previous example, the way a person construes the picture of the 
model on the fridge affect her reactions. Positive self-evaluations and self-enhancement 
occur when the person is recognized as not similar. On the contrary, if the model is 
perceived as a peer, such comparison is more likely to negatively affect one’s self-
esteem (Wood, 1989).  
 Drawing on previous research, Collins (1996) suggested that expectations affect 
the consequences of upward comparisons. More specifically, expecting to be similar to 
relevant other causes assimilation, whereas expecting to be different causes contrast 
(Manis & Paskewitz, 1984). Both assimilation and contrast lie on the assumption of 
closeness (Mussweiler, Rüther, & Epstude, 2004) and concern with the way the distance 
between a person and a social target is interpreted. Assimilation is triggered when the 
individual holds the belief that he could obtain the same status as the target (Buunk, 
Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Suls et al., 
2002), and elevates self-worth placing the individual in the target’s superior group 
(Collins, 1996). On the contrary, when the perceived distance is greater, contrast is 
more likely to occur, causing negative consequences for the self. Beside people’s 
motives to control the comparison process, another host of factors affect consequences 
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of upward comparisons. By providing data from different studies, Collins (1996) 
showed that people with higher chronic self-esteem were more likely to report positive 
effects of upward comparisons on mood (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Gibbons & 
Gerrard, 1989). In addition to self-esteem, scholars showed that providing information 
about better off relevant others triggered positive affect, whereas the same information 
about stranger did not affect emotional reactions (Tesser, Pilkington, & McIntosh, 
1989). Lastly, perceived control has been demonstrated to prompt positive mood 
variations. In one experiment, Testa and Major (1990) revealed that participants who 
were led to believe that they had the means to improve their performance were more 
likely to report lower level of depressive and hostile affect. 
 
 1.2.3 Downward comparisons 
 The literature on upward comparisons seems to suggest that people prefer to 
compare with better off similar others. Further, factors like self-esteem, perceived 
similarity and control, positively affect goals, aspirations and mood. Yet, Wills (1981) 
proposed that people can also infer evaluations and increase their well being from those 
who are worse off, thus making downward comparisons.  
 Comparisons with others do not represent ‘passive’ processes in which the 
individual is forced to direct the attention either toward a specific target or the other. 
Rather, as Collins (1996) suggested, people are active agents, capable of choosing 
adequate coping strategies to adapt to the environment as well as to preserve their self 
worth. As much as individuals can construe and interpret the similarity toward a better 
off other to increase aspirations and well-being, they can create and elaborate worse-off 
comparison target to improve their self evaluations (Buunk, Oldersma, & DeDreu 
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2001). Again, the concept of motivation (Collins, 1996) is important to define the 
direction of the comparison.  
 Hackmiller (1966) has been the first to introduce the notion of downward 
comparison. In a study, participants were asked to take a personality test assessing 
“hostility towards parents’ where higher scores indicate higher hostility. Results showed 
that 95% of participants who were told that they obtained a higher score on the test were 
more likely to select downward comparisons, thus comparing to participants who 
obtained a lower score. More interestingly, those who were told this measure 
represented a negative characteristic, made even more downward comparisons 
(Hackmiller, 1966). In the same year, Thornton and Arrowood (1966) demonstrated that 
participants who were told they had high negative personality trait made more 
comparisons with worse off participants. Following this line of research, Wills (1981), 
as a core assumption of his downward comparison theory, suggested that one of the 
most important causes leading to these kind of comparisons is the perceived threat to 
people’s self-worth (see also Collins, 1996).  
 In line with this assumption, people actively choose worse off target to increase 
their well-being. For example, in a study on breast cancer patients, Wood, Taylor and 
Lichtman (1985) found that participants seemed to benefit from comparison with less 
fortunate patients. Suls, Martin and Wheeler (2002) suggested that these comparisons 
might be adopted to help patients, given their positive effects.  
 Buunk and colleagues (2001) suggested that choosing such comparisons could 
contribute to a better perception of one’s status and situation. Work by Jensen and 
Karoly (1992) showed chronic patients benefit from the exposure to worse off peers 
reporting lower depression, and Buunk and Ybema (1995) found that individuals who 
compared their situations with worse others reported higher satisfaction one year later. 
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In the health domain Affleck, Pfeiffer, Tennen and Fifield (1987) examined the role of 
downward comparisons among patients with rheumatoid arthritis, among persons with 
mental retardation (Gibbons, 1985), and bulimics (Gerrard, Gibbons & Sharp, 1985).  
 The health domain does not represent the only field in which people experience 
benefits by comparing themselves to less fortunate others. For example, people who 
experience job disruption (Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan, & Mullan, 1981), and marital 
conflict (Menaghan, 1982) bear support for the positive benefits of downward 
comparisons.  
 
1.3 The source of comparison 
 What outlined so far clearly demonstrated the social impact of Festinger’s theory.  
The main assumption is that people need to evaluate their opinions and their abilities, 
and in doing so they seek comparison with others who are not too divergent from 
themselves, that is, people they can compare with on similar dimensions (Festinger, 
1954; Wood, 1989). I illustrated how the agent plays an active role in selecting the 
comparison target, and in doing so he selects relevant others who are better off or worse 
off, according to his competing needs. Collins (1996) suggested that upward 
comparisons have positive effects on self worth, while Wills (1981) argued that 
comparison with less fortunate others may serve self-enhancement motives, increase 
self-esteem and reduce stress (Crocker & Gallo, 1985; Gibbons, 1986). Although past 
literature warns that drawing straightforward conclusions on the specific effects of 
downward and upward comparisons is not possible, it should be safe to argue that more 
general self evaluations derive from comparisons with worse off others.  
 Research exploring the effect of different sources of comparison is scarce 
(Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, & Köller, 2008). More specifically, Marsh and colleagues 
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(2008), noticed that “the historically important construct of generalized others” (p. 512) 
has not received enough attention, and exploring the consequences of this source of 
comparison has potential in understanding people’s behavior. Buckingham and Alicke 
(2002), claim the understanding where the comparison comes from is important, mostly 
because several real life situations entail feedbacks arising from specific individuals as 
well as from “aggregate statistical information” (p. 1117).  
 For instance, a student can evaluate her score on a test by comparison with other 
peers in the same class, or, on the other hand, she may compare it to the average 
performance of a specific referent group. In real life, applicants seeking to enter 
graduate schools do not compare their scores on the GRE or the GMAT with the other 
applicants, or with specific students who undertake the same tests in previous sessions. 
Rather, what is important is their percentile scores compared with the average score 
obtained by a larger sample on the same test in the last 12 months.  
 In the workplace, employees can receive information about the average salary of 
colleagues, or in academia, researchers can compare their number of publications with 
the average articles published by faculty in the same department. Klein (1997) was the 
first to highlight the effect of an aggregate reference point. In a series of study the 
author investigated participants’ self-evaluations when their scores in an aesthetic test 
were experimentally manipulated. In one condition participants were told that they 
scored above the group average, whereas in the other condition participants were told 
that their scores were below the average. Klein (1997) noticed that participants reported 
more favorable self-evaluations when they were led to believe that their score was better 
than the average. Further, participants in the “better than the average” condition were 
also more likely to continue with the task. What is even more relevant is that aggregate 
comparison (the average) had more influence than participants’ numerical scores.  
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 Following Klein (1997), Buckingham e Alicke (2002) ran several studies to 
investigate the role and the effect of individual and aggregate social comparison on 
people’ self-evaluations. The authors wondered whether the relevance of the aggregate 
feedback could replace the influence of the individual comparison.  
 As a starting point the authors claimed that aggregate (average) feedback is more 
informative that individual feedback, and this is because the former is based on a larger 
sample (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002). It follows that the more informative the 
feedback is, the more accurate the evaluation of one’s ability will be. This is in line with 
Festinger’s original formulation, when he stated that people strive to obtain stable and 
precise information about themselves (Festinger, 1954).  
 If average feedback is more informative and people draw more affective reactions 
from being either better or worse than the average, then, it seems reasonable to believe 
that it can have greater potential in affecting also behavioral responses. Isen (1970) 
showed that participants who scored above the norm on different tasks donated more 
money than those whose scores were below the norm. Although interesting, these 
results did not include a condition in which participants received feedback about a 
specific target. Klein (2003) investigated this effect in two studies, measuring people’s 
disposition to help others in solving a word completion task (the “Hangman”). 
Participants could choose among five different hints that varied in difficulty, and 
helping behavior was assessed with the number of hard or easy hints that were given to 
help the other in solving the game.  
 Results showed higher helping behavior and more positive affective reactions 
among those who received comparative positive feedback. In a second study, Klein 
(2003) had participants compare their scores in an unrelated task with 1) another 
participant, or 2) the average participant. Adopting the same experimental procedure as 
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in Study 1, the author showed that, again, those who receive positive feedback were 
more likely to give easier hints. More interestingly, when participants compared their 
score with the average participant, the disposition to help was even stronger (Klein, 
2003).  
 On the contrary, comparing their scores to objective standards (i.e. a specific 
person) did not increase prosocial tendencies. The author concluded that comparisons 
with the “average” are more informative, exert greater effect on behavior, and increase 
positive affective reactions. Such findings are important because they extend previous 
work on social comparison processes, showing that people draw significant meanings 
and evaluations even when objective information is absent, thus contrasting previous 
assumptions by Festinger (1954).  
 Perloff and Fetzer (1986) explored how specific and more vague target affected 
participants’ judgments of vulnerability. In two studies the authors revealed that 
participants perceived themselves as less vulnerable when compared to ‘average others’, 
than when comparison were made with specific social target. Further, they concluded 
that the ambiguity of more general feedback led participants to select downward 
comparisons, suggesting that this strategy allowed for a more favorable perception of 
their status, increased well-being and self-enhancement (Wills, 1981).  
 Recently, Bruchman and Evans (2013) extended the effects of global and 
individual comparison on people’s self-evaluations by proposing that different mindsets 
can moderate the relationship between the source of information and individuals’ 
ratings of satisfaction in a task. Adopting the construal level theory framework 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998), these authors showed that participants primed to think about 
why they should carry out specific behaviors were more likely to express greater 
satisfaction and more positive self evaluations when led to believe that they were 
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performing better than the average. On the contrary, when primed to think in a more 
concrete way about the same behavior, participants did not exhibit differences in 
evaluation ratings when provided specific or average feedback (Bruchman & Evans, 
2013).  
 
1.4 Local comparisons, general comparisons and the “Frog-Pond Effect” 
 Previous work by Buckingham and Alicke (2002) suggested that aggregate 
source of comparisons (i.e. comparisons with the mean) are more informative, and 
represent a more diagnostic source of information for participants’ self-evaluations. 
These comparisons are also defined ‘global’, opposed to those in which a person 
compares with single others, defined as ‘individual’. Klein (1997), in a series of studies 
showed that participants who were led to believe that they were scoring above the 
average reported more favorable self-evaluations than did participants who scored 
below the average. Although social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) has never 
explicitly highlighted the difference between individual-other and global-other as source 
of information, on many occasions people are exposed to different available social 
targets that can be adopted as reference standard for skills, opinions and abilities. 
Gilbert, Gisler and Morris (1995), argue that the spontaneity of the comparison 
processes can prompt people to compare their abilities and performances with any target 
available. This is important because it recognizes the active role of the agent, especially 
when the environment imposes specific constraints to social comparisons. In some 
circumstances people may compare their standing within a relatively small group of 
peers, whereas in other situations the comparison may involve a larger number of 
individuals. Alicke, Zell and Bloom (2010) illustrate and example of how the size of the 
group can affect individuals’ evaluation of their abilities. Consider the example of a 
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student who ranks in the middle of a group of 10 other students. Now, suppose that this 
student, with the same grade, compares her performance within two different groups of 
5 students. In the first group, her score places her at the bottom of the ranking, whereas 
in the second group the same score places her at the top of the ranking. In these 
situations she looks at her same performance in two different ways (being the best vs. 
being the worst) drawing different evaluations of the same score depending on the 
reference points available in the environment.  
 Alicke and colleagues (2010) investigated these possible scenarios in one 
experiment. Their research question aimed to understand whether comparison with 
smaller group have stronger influence on individuals’ self evaluations than comparisons 
with larger samples. Participants were categorized into one of two 5-persons groups. 
Students in one group sat on the left side of the room, whereas those in the other group 
sat on the right side of the room. Then they received false feedback about their 
performance on a lie detection task. More specifically, they were told that they ranked 
5th, 6th or 10th among the ten students in the room, and asked to evaluate their 
performance. Then some participants were given additional information that they 
ranked best or worst in their 5-student group. 
 Results showed that those who were led to believe they ranked 5th or 6th among 
the ten students in the room did not show differences in their evaluations. Yet, those 
who ranked 6ht but were also told that they performed best in their 5-student group 
reported higher evaluations than those who ranked 5th but were informed that they were 
the worsts in their 5-student group.  
 The findings of this study showed a paradoxical situation in which ranking as 6th 
in a group turned out to be better than occupy the 5th position. This is because 
comparisons within one’s reference group receive greater weight and are more 
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informative that broader comparisons. The authors recognized that drawing more 
attention from a smaller sample is also in line with previous research stating that people 
are less sensitive to large numbers and base rates (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
However, relevant to the purpose of this work, is important to highlight that the size of 
the source of information affect individuals’ evaluation of abilities.  
 
1.5 Aggregate and individual feedback 
  Thus far I reviewed evidences suggesting that people can compare to different 
others, and can evaluate their performance within either smaller or larger group of 
peers. Yet, the findings discussed yield different predictions and consequences on 
people’s behavior. Following Klein (1997), comparison with an average performance 
represents a more diagnostic source of information as it entails feedback about a larger 
sample. At the same time, authors like Borgida and Nisbett (1977) showed that 
sometimes people underestimate aggregate data. To clarify this point, Buckingham and 
Alicke (2002), suggested that, when single individuals are present, comparison with 
larger sample are less informative. Their assumptions were tested in a series of studies, 
in which self-ratings of ability and performance were compared across different 
experimental conditions. In study 1, the authors showed that evaluations of 
performances on a lie detection task were only affected by the presence of a single 
target, even though base rate information was provided, whereas when no specific 
individual was present, participants’ evaluations were more affected by aggregate 
information (study 3 and study 4). In the fifth study the authors created two 
experimental conditions in which participants ranked either above or below the average, 
and took a lie detection task either alone or with another individual in the same room. 
While in the previous studies it has been shown that the effects of aggregate and 
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individual reference others affected ratings of abilities and performance differently, in 
this study participants had to evaluate only their performance on the test. The rationale 
was that, given the objective nature of the measure to evaluate, the aggregate score was 
supposed to exert greater influence on participants’ rating (see Klein, 1997 for a similar 
argument).  
 Results of this study revealed that when the ratings regard specific and objective 
measures, in this case the specific performance on a lie detection task, the presence of a 
single other had no influence on participants’ responses. In line with previous work 
(Klein, 1997), these findings demonstrated that aggregate and global comparisons 
represent the most influential source of feedback.  
 This is particularly relevant and has strong real life implications. Social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1982), states that people define their identities at different 
levels, from a purely individual perspective to a broader definition of themselves as 
member of a specific group. These categorization processes are based on similarities 
between the single individual and the other members, and are responsible for several 
social behaviors such as influence (Asch, 1951), leadership (Hogg, van Knippenberg, 
&. Rast, 2012), and prejudice (Reynolds, Haslam, & Turner, 2012). 
 Understanding when and to whom people compare themselves is paramount in 
the social context. Different frames can easily lead to misrepresentation of one’s 
performance or ability in a task and in the workplace, or to a distort evaluation of one’ 
standing among the other employees. In the economic domain such effect is even 
stronger, as oftentimes individuals do not compare their wealth in absolute values, but 
relatively to the wealth of the group they belong. As a consequence, their perception of 
happiness and wellbeing can be biased by their position in the social hierarchy. By 
virtue of its social nature, Festinger’s theory and its more recent developments can be 
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adopted to study different social behaviors, especially in the economic domain. In the 
next chapter I will review literature suggesting how distinct rankings affect cooperation 
and competition (Garcia, et al., 2006). 
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Chapter 2 
Social Comparison, Rankings, and Social Behavior 
  
 In the earliest formulation of the social comparison theory, Festinger (1954) 
stated that the tendency to outperform others is intrinsic in nature, and individuals look 
at better others to set higher goals and achievements. However, research also showed 
the negative effects of comparing with better others and the ego deflating influence of 
those comparisons on people self evaluation and self esteem (see Collins, 1996). 
Previous work explored the effect of these comparisons on individual dimensions. For 
instance, scholars showed that comparing to better others produced jealousy (Salovey & 
Rodin, 1984), hostility (Testa & Major, 1990), frustration (Martin, 1986) as well as 
lower self-evaluation tendencies (Morse & Gergen, 1970). Yet, less has been done in 
exploring the consequences of upward comparisons on people’s behavior.  
  Although Festinger (1954, p. 126) suggested that upward comparisons affect 
competition and cooperation, these behaviors were interpreted as a tendency to reduce 
the discrepancy among “better” and “worse” members of the same group. An early 
study by Greenberg (1932) revealed that children were more willing to help worse off 
peers in a game where they were asked to build objects out of stones. However, the 
author concluded that helping behavior was not an altruistic act in nature, rather an 
indirect form of competition and a strategy that better off kids adopted to display 
superior skills. Similarly, Hoffman, Festinger and Lawrence (1954) showed that when 
one participant in a group of three started to perform considerably well in a task, the 
other two participants acted to prevent him to acquire additional points. Several factors 
affect competition in the social comparison domain. For example, Garcia and Tor 
(2007) suggested that relevance, commensurability and closeness foster competitive 
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behavior. Tesser (1988), and Beach and Tesser (2000) showed that comparisons with 
better others increase competition when the dimension is relevant to the self and the 
social target (Tesser & Smith, 1980). Lastly, building on the principle of similarity, 
Jones and Rachlin (2006) illustrated that the amount of money a person was willing to 
forego in order to benefit someone else was affected by perceived closeness between 
them. 
 Exploring cooperation and competition as a function of different kind of 
comparisons is relevant in modern societies. From the educational setting, to more 
complex workplace behaviors, both in macro and micro economic domains, people 
interact with others, and these interactions have a strong effect on social behaviors. 
Whether employees are asked to work in teams with other peers, or firms compete to 
acquire a greater market share, it is clear that these behaviors do not occur in a vacuum. 
When deciding whether to engage a joint venture with another nonprofit organization, a 
CEO will not only look at the joint final outcome, but he will consider whether the other 
organization is better or worse off, and how the venture can influence the standing of 
his firm in the market. Similarly, a student will be more or less willing to cooperate in a 
team class project to the extent that the final grade will affect not only her performance 
but also her status in the class.  
 What outlined above highlights the importance of understanding with who people 
compare themselves, but, more importantly, shows that different behaviors can arise 
according to how people perceive their ranking in the relevant group.  
 
2.1 Rankings, cooperation and competition 
 The role of the social environment in influencing behaviors is important, because 
on many occasions individuals are included in or may perceive themselves as part of 
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rankings elaborated along several different dimensions. For example, a student can be 
the top ranked in her class, or an athlete can be the last in his age group when running a 
5 kilometers road race. Rankings are pervasive in modern societies. Every year the 
global business magazine Fortune lists the largest 500 corporations in the United States 
based on their gross revenues, the Financial Times ranks the most prestigious MBA 
programs, and the business magazine Forbes lists the richest American businessmen. 
Rankings can also become hierarchies that spontaneously arise on many occasions and 
in different domains. 
 Although research seems to suggest only a weak correlation between subjective 
well-being and high standing in the social hierarchy (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 
1999), it has been recognized that high status represents prominence, dominance, and 
respect (Ivanic, et al., 2011). For this reason it is reasonable to believe that individuals 
strive to be among the top students in the class, or the wealthiest among their peers. The 
concept of ranking is not new in the research on social comparison. Wheeler and 
colleagues (1969) adopted for the first time a rank order paradigm across different 
experimental studies. Participants were divided in small groups and had to take a test. 
After completing the test they were given false feedback about their performance. At the 
end of the session they were asked whether they would like to view another 
participant’s score. Results revealed that the majority of participants chose to compare 
their performance to the score of better others. Interestingly, participants chose to view 
the top scorer and, only at the end, the score of the last ranked participant (Thornton & 
Arrowood, 1966).  
 In these studies the concept of ranking was not directly manipulated, yet it is 
worth noting that when given the opportunity to view another participant’s score, 
individuals chose not only better others, but the top and the last ranked in order to 
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acquire information about the overall range of others performance. In turn, this 
information enabled them to judge their standing more precisely. The rank order 
paradigm was used to study to whom participants would compare in an experimental 
setting (Suls & Wheeler, 2000; Wheeler, 1966), however no insight was provided to 
understand how comparing to the top or the last scorer affected participants’ behavior.  
 The tendency to compare to the top is premised on the “existence of an obvious, 
and ubiquitous standard, namely, the top” (Garcia, et al., 2006). Following this 
rationale, Garcia and colleagues (2006) posited that the tendency to adopt upward 
comparisons should be even greater when in proximity to the top, since higher standings 
are better and convey importance, respect and dominance (Ivanic et al., 2011). Bridging 
research on competition and social comparisons, Garcia, and colleauges (2006) 
conducted a series of studies to explore whether rankings increase competition, and, 
more specifically, tested the hypothesis that proximity to the top or the bottom of a 
given ranking amplifies such behaviors. Of particular importance for the remainder of 
this work is the idea the any ranking that signify a standard can increase competition. In 
other words, competition should increase when participants are close the top and the 
bottom of the ranking, given that no one want to perform worse than everybody else.  
 
2.2 Proximity to a meaningful standard 
 Garcia and colleagues (2006) asked participants to imagine they were CEOs of 
nonprofit organizations ranked 1st in donation earnings in the “Top 500 Nonprofit”, and 
asked them whether they would be willing to engage in a joint venture with another 
nonprofit organization. In a between subject design the experimenters manipulated the 
ranking of the two organizations. In one condition participants were told that the other 
organization ranked 2nd, whereas in the other condition was ranked 102nd among 500. 
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Participants were asked to choose whether to join or not the venture. Choosing to join 
would increase their donations earnings by 7%, and the donations of the other 
organization by 25%. On the contrary, choosing not to join the venture would increase 
their donations by 5%, and the donation of the other organization by 5%. Results 
showed that only 56% of participants maximized their profit when the other 
organization was ranked 2nd, compared to 79% who did so when the organization 
ranked 102nd. In a second study the authors explored whether competition would arise 
in proximity to standards even when payoffs were removed from the scenarios. Again, 
participants were more likely to show competition when their organization ranked 9th 
and the other 10th, compared to when their organization ranked 209th and the other 
210th. More interestingly, participants reported that they would feel more pain if 
surpassed by the other organization when they ranked 9th and 10th respectively, 
compared to when they both occupy an intermediate standing. In a third study 
participants were asked to imagine they would play a poker tournament, and for the 
final round they were asked to choose a player with whom they could team up. In this 
study Garcia and colleagues (2006) kept the distance between participants’ ranking and 
those of others players constant, yet varying the distance from the top of the ranking. In 
one condition the participant ranked 3rd and the opponent 4th, in the second condition 
they ranked 6th and 7th respectively, in the third 12th and 13th and in the fourth 24th and 
25th. Participants could choose between two strategies, either to team up or to play solo. 
Team up would increase their earnings by 5% and their rival’s by 5%, whereas playing 
solo would lead to 10% increase for the participants and a 25% increase for the other 
player. Similarly to previous results, the authors found that the percentage of 
participants willing to maximize joint gains was significantly lower when both players 
occupied a higher standing in the ranking.  
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 The main assumption of the authors is that comparison to any standard should 
increase competition, especially when these standards are meaningful. Benchmarks in 
the proximity of the top of the ranking can increase motivation, and the desire to be 
among the best performers in a relevant group. At the same time, standards that 
coincide with the bottom are also informative, as they communicate that a person is 
performing poorly, and her skills, income or abilities are among the worst in a group. 
As a consequence, also individuals ranking in the proximity of the bottom should be 
more likely to adopt any strategy to improve their status. By adopting a similar 
procedure as in the previous experiments, Garcia and colleagues (2006) found support 
for this hypothesis, showing that participants were less likely to maximize their overall 
performance when ranked 499th and the other classmate ranked 500th in a group of 500 
students.  
 Poortvliet, Janssen, Van Yiperen and Van de Vliert (2009) extended the role of 
rankings in modulating competitive and cooperative behavior. Building on previous 
studies showing that proximity to a relevant standard increase competition (Garcia & 
Tor, 2007), these authors suggested that differences in individuals’ goal orientation also 
affect rivalry. Performance goals entail comparisons with others, and focus on the final 
outcome of a given behavior. On the contrary, mastery goals entail comparison with 
one’s previous performance on a given task, and are related to greater tendency to 
acquire new skills and ability (Elliot, 2005). Given the differences in the comparison 
target, different goals have the potential to highlight the mechanisms underlying 
competitive behaviors in exchange information settings. Poortvliet and colleagues 
(2009) hypothesized that performance goals individuals should be more likely to see 
relevant others as potential adversaries, especially when close to the top of the raking. 
This should lead to less cooperative behavior, compared to situations in which both 
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players occupy intermediate positions in the ranking. On the contrary, mastery goals 
individual should be more oriented to self-improvement and less likely to see the other 
player as a threat to their standing.  
 Adopting the winter survival game paradigm (Johnson & Johnson, 2000), 
Poortvliet and colleagues (2009) manipulated participants’ ranking in a between subject 
design (goal orientation: performance vs. mastery). After a first round of the game, 
participants were informed that they occupied the 96th, 51st, or 4th (low, intermediate and 
high rank, respectively) position within a group of 100. Then they were told that they 
could exchange information with another participant who carried out the same task, and 
ranked respectively 97th, 52nd, and 5th within the same group. At this point the authors 
informed that all participants would have another round to play in the survival game. In 
the performance goal condition participants were asked to perform better that the other 
player, whereas in the mastery goal condition they were told to outperform their 
personal performance in the first round. Results showed weak cooperation intentions 
among high and low ranked performance goal individuals. Yet, cooperation intentions 
of mastery goal participants were higher as their ranked decreased, showing that only 
low ranked mastery and performance individuals differed in their tendency to cooperate. 
 The studies reviewed above have shown that proximity to meaningful standards 
increase competition, whereas occupying intermediate ranking maximizes joint gains 
and leads to more cooperative behaviors. However, Garcia and Tor (2007) suggested 
that introducing a conceptual distinction between task and scale performance is 
important to deepen the effect of different ranking on competitive and cooperative 
behaviors. The authors define task comparisons those that concern the relative outcome 
in a specific task, whereas scale comparisons entail standing on a more general level 
(Garcia & Tor, 2007). Although connected, these two dimensions of comparisons are 
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not directly correlated. For instance, individuals and firms may obtain lower individual 
profit to the extent to which they can maintain their standing in a specific ranking. Thus, 
the threat to be surpassed in the scale (rank) may hamper more individual profit 
maximizations.  
 The distinction between scale and task performance is important as it can shed 
light on the mechanisms underlying competitive behaviors, especially in proximity to 
relevant standards. To disentangle the effect of scale and task performances, Garcia and 
Tor (2007) hypothesized that rivals in proximity to a standard would be less willing to 
accept upward comparisons when this coincided with an upward comparison on a scale. 
Put it differently, when close to the top (the bottom) of a ranking, individuals would be 
less likely to maximize their profit when the threat of being surpassed on their relative 
standing is salient. Building on previous research by Garcia and colleagues (2006), the 
authors told participants they would play a poker tournament, and before the final round 
they had to choose whether to practice with a rival. Choosing to practice would increase 
participants’ earnings by 10% (and the rival’s earnings by 25%). In contrast, choosing 
not to practice would increase both the participant and the rival’s earnings by 5%. In the 
scale comparison condition participants were informed that choosing to practice would 
allow the rival to surpass the participant in the ranking. Ranking was manipulated 
within participants. Participants had to indicate whether they would be willing to 
practice when they hypothetically ranked 1st [101st] and the rival ranked 2nd [102nd] in 
the group. In the no scale comparison condition participants had to face the same 
questions but no information about being surpassed was provided. Results showed that 
only 25% of participants chose to maximize their joint gains when facing upward 
comparisons on the scale when they and their rival ranked 1st and 2nd respectively. On 
the contrary, 79% of participants maximized their joint gains they and their rival ranked 
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101st and 102nd. More interestingly, when no scale threat was salient, no difference in 
cooperation rates emerged across conditions.  
 Using a similar methodology, in a second study the authors showed that 
participants were less willing to maximize joint gains also in proximity to the bottom of 
the ranking, especially when this could allow an opponent to surpass them in the global 
standing. Out of 42 participants, only 13% in the bottom ranking condition maximized 
profits, compared to 70% in intermediate ranking condition. In a third study Garcia and 
colleagues (2007) extended these findings to real world data, by measuring how Major 
League Baseball teams trade players. By collecting data from ESPN.com and 
MLB4U.com over 12 months, the authors revealed that high ranked baseball teams 
were less likely to trade players with other highly ranked teams when this could pose a 
threat to their standing in the league.  
 Yet, in modern societies hierarchies are not fixed, and people can increase their 
wealth, their performance, their income over time, while, at the same time, other 
individuals in the same group can do the same. Further, a rational economic approach 
(Von Neaumann & Morgenstern, 1944) would also predict that people should maximize 
their payoff over time irrespective of that of relevant others. In a fourth study, Garcia 
and Tor (2007) wondered whether rivals would be willing to trade disadvantageous 
inequality for extra profit and an upward comparison if they simultaneously improve 
their ranking on a scale. Put it simply, would a firm be willing to be surpassed by a rival 
when at the same time it could increase its ranking? And is this mechanism affected by 
the proximity to a standard? Garcia and Tor (2007) tested this hypothesis by presenting 
participants a modified version of the poker game (see Garcia & Tor, study 4). 
Participants were asked to choose whether to practice with another player, and informed 
that practicing would increase their payoffs by 10% and their rival’s by 25%. On the 
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contrary, choosing not to practice would increase both players’ earnings by 5%. In one 
condition participants were told that practicing would allow their rival to surpass them 
in the ranking. In another condition they were informed that practicing would allow 
their rival to surpass them, but at the same time participants would also increase their 
standing from 5th to 3rd. Thus, in the latter condition individuals had to face the dilemma 
of being surpassed in order to, at the same time, getting closer to the top of the ranking. 
Results showed that 78% of participants decided to maximize their profit (and being 
surpassed in the ranking) when doing so allowed for an improvement in their standing, 
especially when in proximity of the top. On the contrary, only 35% of the sample 
decided to maximize their earnings when no improvement in their ranking was possible.  
 These results are important since they highlight the power of standards, 
especially close to the top of a ranking. The authors concluded that “in proximity of 
standards, absolute scale standing becomes such an important means for self-
evaluation that rivals may willingly accept a painful upward comparison on the scale in 
order to improve their absolute standing” (Garcia & Tor, 2007. p. 25).  
 
2.3 Does the size of the group matter? 
 Evidence from past studies carried out by Garcia and colleagues (2006) and 
Garcia and Tor (2007) suggests that the perception of one’s relative standing represents 
an important factor capable to affect cooperation and competition, especially in 
proximity to relevant standards, be they either the top or the bottom of a hierarchy. The 
ranking methodology, as an extension of social comparison theory, allows for a better 
understanding of social behaviors not only in laboratory experiments, but also in many 
real world domains. As previously illustrated, professional baseball teams were less 
likely to trade players with other teams when the threat of being surpassed in the 
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ranking was salient (Garcia & Tor, 2007). Graduate programs aim to be in the top list of 
the US News and World Report, students strive to be the top ranked within a class, and 
employees aim to be elected as the ‘best of the month’. Of course real world contexts 
are difficult to replicate in experimental settings, however, it seems reasonable to 
believe that many experiments resemble several processes observed in the studies 
aforementioned.  
As stated in the beginning of this work, individuals in different contexts strive to be the 
best, oftentimes caught in a rat race with no end. The hedonic treadmill model 
(Brickman & Campbell, 1971) captures this social competition, describing a situation in 
which people set higher and higher goals, confident that happiness and well-being lie 
“around the corner” (Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006).  
 Research on the frog-pond effect (Alicke, Zell & Bloom, 2010) demonstrated the 
satisfactions with one’s own performance depend on the relative ranking of a student 
within a reference group. For instance, ranking 6th in a group of ten could be better than 
ranking 5th in a group of five, although the grade is the same in the two scenarios. 
Similarly, winning a local race with other 100 competitors can be more exciting than 
winning a race against 5 participants.  
 Garcia and Tor (2009) studied how the size of the group affects competition and 
cooperation. They propose a “N-Effect”, showing that increasing the number of 
competitors can, under some circumstances, decrease competitive behaviors. More 
specifically, the authors claimed that comparing with a greater number of participants is 
less informative to the self. Garcia and Tor (2009) built their theoretical approach on 
previous literature on social facilitation (Zajonc, 1965) and social loafing (Latané, 
Williams, & Harkins, 1979). Social loafing predicts that people’s effort will decrease 
when an individual task is transformed in a collective task, whereas social facilitation 
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hypothesizes that individual’s motivation will decrease in the presence of others. Such 
reasoning is also in line with literature exploring the diffusion of responsibility effect 
(Darley & Latané, 1968), which shows people’s failure to assist someone in need in 
presence of other individuals. Building on these assumptions, Garcia and Tor (2009) 
suggested that competition should decrease in presence of others. More specifically, an 
increase in the number of individuals in a given context should lessen the saliency of 
social comparisons, thus making more difficult to identify specific others.  
 The authors tested this assumption across a series of studies. The first part of their 
research was a correlational study that aimed to understand the relationship between 
students’ scores in the cognitive reflection task (CRT1, Frederick, 2005) and in the 
scholastic aptitude test (SAT2) and group dimension. By controlling for the size of the 
sample, the authors found that lower performances occurred when the samples were 
smaller. These results represent a first step indicating that in the presence of fewer 
others, students were less motivated to put effort in a specific test. In a second study the 
authors investigated the same effect in a more controlled setting. To assess participants’ 
motivation, the experimenter asked the respondents to complete a quiz as fast as 
possible without compromising the accuracy of their answers. Furthermore, to create an 
incentive, the experimenter told students that those whose completion times were in the 
top 20% would receive $5. The experimental conditions were manipulated as following. 
In one condition participants were told that they would compete against 10 students, 
whereas in another condition they were told they would compete against 100 other 
students. Results indicated that participants in the 10-person competition completed the 
quiz faster that those in the 100-person competition. Such findings indicate that the 
mere presence of others (Suls & Wheeler, 2000) is sufficient to trigger the motivation to 
                                                            
1 The test, built on research on dual process theory (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) was developed by Frederick (2005) to assess 
individuals’ ability to suppress intuitive wrong answers in favor or more deliberate right answers. 
2 A standardized test for college admissions widely adopted in the United States. 
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perform better on a given task. In a third study the authors hypothesized that social 
comparison orientation would affect the relationship between the size of a reference 
group and participants’ performance. Social comparison orientation was assessed with 
the 11 items of Gibbons and Buunk’s scale (1999), in order to measure differences in 
the degree to which people tend to compare to others.  
 Participants were asked to read two vignettes in which they had to imagine they 
were running a 5-K race with other people. In one condition they were told that they 
were competing with 50 participants, whereas in another condition they were running 
with 500 participants. As a dependent variable, Garcia and Tor (2009) asked 
participants to rate on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = faster than normal, 7 = fastest in my life) 
to what extent they would run faster than normal. Results showed that participants 
reported they would run faster when among other 50 people, and that individuals high in 
social comparison orientation were more likely to exhibit the N-effect. A possible 
explanation for the N-effect is that people exhibit denominator neglect (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2008) and ratio bias (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). These phenomena suggest 
that people are not capable to focus on the overall number of opportunities for a specific 
target event to happen (Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Dhami, 2013). In the context of 
these studies it is possible to state that the inability to consider the total amount of 
participants in a given competition would affect individuals’ tendency to compete. To 
test this possible explanation, Garcia and Tor (2009) presented 54 participants with an 
online survey. Participants read a scenario in which they had to imagine they were 
invited for a job interview with a company, and that the company was extending offers 
to only 20% of the qualified applicants. In a within subjects design participants’ 
competitive feelings were assessed when a total of 10, 30, 50, and 100 other applicants 
were applying for the same job offer. To further measure the nature of the social 
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comparison, participants were also asked to what degree they compared themselves to 
the other candidates, expressing their preferences on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very 
much). Ratio bias was assessed through a scenario adapted from previous work done by 
Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) in which participants read that a person was playing two 
lotteries. In one lottery this person had to select a single winning number from a 
thousand, whereas in another lottery the same person had to pick 10 winning numbers 
from ten thousand numbers. Participants were told that this person won the lottery, and 
asked whether winning was due to picking one lucky number out of a thousand or 10 
from 10 thousands. Results replicated previous evidences showing that competitive 
feelings decreased when the number of applicants increased. More interestingly, the 
ratio bias did not affect participants’ responses, demonstrating that the size of the 
comparison group is the main cause of the N-effect.   
 Another factor that can account for less competition in bigger groups is the 
perception of the task. More specifically, competition can decrease because individuals 
perceive the task as too easy (Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007), or too difficult. For 
example, a marathon runner can put less effort in a race when she perceives that 
winning is easy, or, on the contrary, a student can decrease the motivation to perform 
well on graduate school admission tests if she believes that the chances to be admitted 
in are too small and scoring in the top percentile is too difficult. In a study by Garcia 
and Tor (2009) participants were asked to imagine they had to compete against 10 or 
10,000 others students around the country in a challenge in which the goal was to add as 
many new friends as possible to their Facebook account. As in the preceding 
experiments, the authors measured participants’ motivation to compete as well as the 
tendency to engage in social comparisons with others. To test the main prediction that 
the perceived difficult of the task would also affect the disposition to compete, 
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participants were asked to rate how easy it would be to win the challenge. Results 
showed that the motivation to compete was greater when the sample size was smaller. 
Further, participants competing with 10 other people believed that it would be easier to 
win the challenge. The most interesting finding, however, revealed that the tendency to 
engage in social comparisons mediates the relationship between the number of other 
opponents and participants’ motivation to compete.  
 
2.4 More implicit measures. Facial expressions, rankings and cooperation 
 What outlined above demonstrates the pervasive nature of rankings and their 
effect on behavior. Relevant others can affect cooperation and joint maximization of 
outcomes, as well as increase competition to reach the top of a standing in a relevant 
group. Moreover, rankings have been demonstrated to gauge more individualistic 
responses’ (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). Similarly, individuals high in 
the social hierarchy are more likely to exhibit self-centered behaviors (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). This evidence seem to suggest that occupying a high 
standing on a relevant dimension not only increases competition, but also fosters less 
prosocial conducts. On many occasions, however, rankings can be signaled with more 
implicit symbols and nonverbal appearances. Chen, Myers, Kopelman and Garcia 
(2012), aimed to study whether facial expressions can convey ranking meanings, and 
whether observers’ ability to detect them lead to more cooperative dispositions. 
Building on previous literature showing that facial expressions represent accurate 
representations of others’ state of mind (Willis & Todorov, 2006), and on work showing 
that social status and power can shape people’s facial expressions (Carney, Hall, & 
LeBeau, 2005), Chen and colleagues (2012) aimed to test whether participants would 
perceive high status ranked individuals as less cooperative than lower status individuals.  
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In a first study the authors tested whether the higher a school rank was, the less 
cooperative the dean would appear to others. The photographs of 17 male deans from 
the top 20 high-ranked schools according to the U.S News and World Report were used 
in the study. Participants rated on a scale from 1 (not at all cooperative) to 7 (very 
cooperative) each of the deans depicted in the set of photographs. In line with the initial 
assumptions, results showed that the higher the school’s ranking was, the less 
cooperative the deans’ facial expressions were perceived. In a second study, Chen and 
colleagues (2012) adopted a more contextual manipulation to test their hypotheses. In 
the first part of their experiment participants were approached and introduced to another 
student (a confederate). In one condition participants were told that the other student 
was from Yale University (high status), whereas in the other condition they were led to 
believe that the other student was from Washtenaw University (low status). After being 
introduced, participants were asked to take a picture with the other student (the 
confederate) for “record-keeping purposes” (Chen et al., 2012, p. 481). In the second 
part of the study, a different set of participants was recruited, and individuals were 
asked how cooperative they thought the person in the picture looked like, on a scale 
from 1 to 7. Results demonstrated that participants who were told in the first phase that 
they had been introduced to a Yale student were perceived as more cooperative. On the 
contrary, participants who were led to believe that they took a picture with a lower 
status other were perceived as less cooperative.  
 While previous research tested cooperation and competition as a consequence of 
people’s contextual standing in a relevant group (Garcia et al., 2006), Chen and 
colleagues’ work tapped into participants’ perception of someone else’s status. This is 
important because social interactions, such as competition and cooperation, are also 
driven by more subtle cues that communicate about the nature of the relationship 
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(Argyle, 1988; Goffman, 1959; Patterson, 1983; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Observing 
someone else’s nonverbal behaviors, such as changes in postures, expresses dominance 
or submission (Argyle, 1988; Gifford, 1991), communicates the status of the other 
person (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003), and implicitly defines the context as competitive 
(Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). In the last of a series of studies, Chen and colleagues (2012) 
showed that differences in the perceived facial expressions of the target affect 
behavioral responses as well. A total of one hundred-fifty four participants were 
recruited to participate in a negotiation-based task. Participants were presented with a 
scenario in which they were asked to play the role of representative of a student 
organization. Each scenario contained either the picture of a dean of one the top 5 
business schools, or the picture of the dean of one of the bottom 5 ranked schools (see 
Chen et al., 2012). In addition to measure how cooperative they perceived the dean, 
participants were also asked to make an initial offer to negotiate an annual budget for 
their organization ranging from $3,000 to $5,000, that they though the dean would 
approve. Such dependent variable allowed for a more behavioral response of 
participants’ reaction towards different facial expressions. While replicating previous 
findings, revealing that high ranked individuals are perceived as less cooperative, the 
authors also showed that participants were more likely to offer a lower amount of 
money in the negotiation context.  
 Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that manipulating the physical 
standing of participants in a given context in not always necessary to trigger less 
cooperative behaviors (Garcia & Tor, 2007, Poortvliet et al., 2009). Rather, more 
implicit measures of status, such as facial expressions have a strong impact in 
modulating self-centered behavioral responses.  
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2.5 Rankings, competition and unethical behavior 
 Thus far I presented evidence showing that the presence of ranking can increase 
competitive behavior among individuals. Knowing one’s position in the society, be it 
the ingroup of peers at work or the classroom, affects the motivation to increase one’s 
performance. On many occasions people are driven by an intrinsic motivation to 
outperform others and obtain positive self-evaluations. Research on neuroecomomics 
showed that being better than someone else is associated with higher levels of serotonin, 
a neurotransmitter capable to enhance feelings of well-being (Madsen, 1994). The 
importance of occupying a high standing indicates that individuals care about how they 
compare to similar others and that great weight is put on their relative position within a 
group. Previous research demonstrated that the need to outperform others in a group is 
also present when no monetary rewards are provided, indicating a strong desire for 
dominance among individuals (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). This last finding is important as 
it denotes that when people know in advance that they will receive feedback about how 
they fare compare to others, competition is more likely to occur. 
 However, although rankings can increase competition and in turn cause higher 
overall performances among employees, they can also prompt more self-centered and 
unethical actions that can be adopted to reach personal ambitions. It is important to 
notice that the goal of this work is not the investigation of the effects of ranking on 
immoral actions. Yet, I believe that exploring the relationship between rankings and 
unethical behavior is noteworthy, especially because of its pervasiveness in the social 
domain. Furthermore, as I will illustrate in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, unethical behavior 
represents a possible strategy to increase one’s standing and increase wealth over time.  
 The idea that high status is positively related to self-centered behaviors is not new 
and scholars already demonstrated that rich individuals are more likely to engage in 
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unethical behaviors (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 
2010). Greater resources, freedom and independence have been demonstrated to be 
important factors in determining illegal actions. The socio economic status (SES) is an 
important indicator of an individual’s ranking in the society. High status means 
dominance (Ivanic et al., 2011), wealth, prestige and education (Adler, Epel, 
Castellazzo, & Icksovics, 2000; Kraus et al., 2011). Having more is also connected to 
other less positive social behaviors. For instance, rich people are more disengaged 
during social interactions, less generous and altruistic, and on a large scale, upper class 
individuals donate less to charitable causes. In support of this idea, Piff, Stancato, Côté, 
Mendoza-Denton, and Keltner (2012) demonstrated that high status individuals were 
more likely to cut off other vehicles at 4-way intersection. As a proxy of status the 
authors relied on the kind of cars that people were driving at the time of the experiment 
(Frank, 1999). Similarly, high status drivers were also more likely to cut off pedestrians 
on a crosswalk. To assess unethical decision making, in another study participants were 
asked whether they would be willing to engage in a series of illicit activities described 
in different scenarios. Social status was assessed through the McArthurs’ scale of 
subjective social economic status (Adler et al., 2000). In line with previous 
assumptions, the authors found a positive correlation between SES and the intention to 
behave unethically. Interestingly, the effect of high status on unethical behavior held 
even when high and low rankings were experimentally manipulated. Literature showed 
that it is possible to successfully induce different social status mindsets with 
experimental manipulations (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; Piff et al., 2010). Piff and 
colleagues (2012) tested whether priming participants to believe they were high or low 
ranked affected unethical decisions, irrespective of the actual SES. Results revealed that 
participants in the upper class priming condition took more candies from a jar that 
 49 
would otherwise go to children. Furthermore, upper class individuals also reported more 
unethical decision across several hypothetical scenarios. Although the preceding 
evidences suggested the direct effect of different ranking conditions on actual and 
hypothetical unethical behavior, it is worth noting that other individuals’ disposition can 
moderate the relationship between SES and actual conducts.  
In the field of negotiations, Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, and Saunders (1994) and 
Murninghan (1991) showed that greed, experienced injustice, and uncertainty triggered 
deception. The role of emotions receives great attention in understanding unethical 
behaviors. Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) explored the role of disgust in moral 
violations, and showed that body cleansing (i.e. choosing antiseptics products or 
washing one’s hands) contribute to alleviate the negative feelings associated to 
unethical behaviors.  
 Envy, defined as an unpleasant and painful feeling of inferiority and resentment 
(Smith & Kim, 2007), has also been related to unethical behavior. Envy arises when 
individuals compare their outcomes to those of others (Smith, Kim, & Parrot, 1988), 
and it is connected to a sense of injustice in situations in which the person believes she 
has been treated unfairly (Smith, Parrot, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994). It is reasonable to argue 
that envy could also arise when a high status person is not at the top of the ranking. For 
instance, it is possible to argue that in the studies described by Garcia and colleagues 
(2006) and Garcia and Tor (2007) envy affected participants’ competitive behaviors in 
proximity to a standard.  
 High and low rankings affect other social behaviors. For instance, research 
showed a less altruistic disposition among high ranked individuals. This is particularly 
relevant, because one would expect that having more resources would be related to 
giving a larger percentage of one’s wealth to charitable causes. Yet, national surveys 
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suggested that high ranked citizens spend greater part of their income on material goods 
and less is allocated to support charity, whereas low status people display more other-
oriented behaviors and at the same time are more concerned with the needs of others. To 
test whether differences in ranking affect prosocial behaviors, Piff, and colleagues 
(2010) run a series of studies to answer this question. In a first study they adopted the 
dictator game to measure participants’ disposition to allocate resources to a counterpart. 
As in previous studies, SES was assessed through the McArthurs’ scale (Adler et al., 
2000). Such measure depicts a ladder with 10 rungs, and asks participants to place a 
large X on the rung they feel they stand relative to others. Lower numbers on the scale 
are associated to lower perceived status. In line with the authors’ assumption, results 
revealed a negative correlation between SES and the tendency to allocate resources to 
another participants. The same pattern was observed when the authors experimentally 
manipulated participants’ relative ranking. A total of 88 undergraduates were presented 
the same McArthurs’ scale adopted in previous sessions. In this study they were asked 
to compare themselves to people at the very top (the very bottom) on the scale, having 
each of the ten rungs represented where people stand in the United States. To further 
activate ranking differences, Piff and colleagues (2012) asked participants to imagine 
they were going to have social interactions with people above (below) them in the social 
ranking, and write up to five sentences to describe how these interactions were likely to 
go (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Then, all participants filled different measures 
including a survey similar to the one adopted by Frank (1999) in order to assess how 
much of their income is spent on different expenses, including charity. Results showed 
that participants who were primed to believe they occupied lower ranking were more 
likely to allocate a greater amount of money to prosocial causes.   
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 Another setting in which rankings are important is the organization. In this setting 
people aim to the top of the hierarchy, striving to increase their relative standing 
compared to others (De Botton, 2004, Hollander, 1958; Podolny, 2005). Because of 
this, it is reasonable to believe that when one’s position, or status, is at stake, individuals 
will go greater lengths to defend it. Competition can assume different forms, and one of 
these is preventing another rival to surpass us. Garcia, Song and Tesser (2010) referred 
to the “social comparison bias” as a phenomenon by which “people tend to protect their 
comparison contexts by making recommendations that prevent others from surpassing 
them on relevant dimensions on which they have high standing, because these 
dimensions are especially important to their self-esteem” (Garcia et al., 2010, p. 98).  
In a first study (Garcia et al., 2010) participants were asked to imagine they were full 
professors at Harvard Law School. In two experimental conditions the authors 
manipulated the quality and the quantity of the publications that participants playing the 
role of the professor had. In one experimental condition they were told that the 
professor had the highest number of prestigious publications in the Harvard Review, 
whereas in the other condition they were told that the professor had the highest number 
of publications in general. They were then told that the Law School was planning on 
hiring two more professors. One candidate was higher in the number of total 
publications (quantity) and lower in the number of quality publications, whereas another 
candidate was higher in the number of quality publications and lower in the total 
number of publications. Results showed that when participants had higher number of 
quality publications, 69% recommended hiring the candidate with an overall greater 
number of total publications. On the contrary, when participants have the greater 
amount of publications in general, only 31% recommended hiring that candidate with 
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the overall greater number of publications. These results suggest that people tend to 
protect themselves, by maintaining distinctive strength on relevant dimensions. 
In a second study, Garcia and colleagues (2010) extended the evidences of the social 
comparison bias to real decisions. Participants received fake score relative to their 
performance on a series of verbal and math questions. In one condition they were 
informed that they scored higher on the math section and lower on the verbal section, 
whereas in the other condition they were told they scored higher on the verbal section 
and lower in the math section. In the next phase of the study individuals were informed 
that they would participate in a coordination task with other students, and asked to make 
a choice between two hypothetical team workers. Participants were given the scores of 
the two candidates (on the verbal and on the math section). Similarly to the previous 
study, participants tended to select the candidate who was worse off on the dimension in 
which they received the higher score. Interestingly, one may argue that students 
preferred to cooperate with another participant who had complimentary skills, in order 
to maximize their joint efforts. Yet, in the ‘hiring he candidate’ scenario, the authors 
clearly stated that the “Law School already has a faculty full of complementary 
interests” (Garcia et al., 2010, p. 99). Similarly, whens students had to choose the 
candidate with higher or lower verbal and math skills, they were told that the 
coordination task involved throwing a tennis ball in different ways, so no particular 
skills were needed.  
 Differences in status also affect how people look at other members of the society. 
Fiske (2010) proposed that social comparisons produce envy towards who is better off 
and scorn towards who is worse off. But what is more interesting is that people place 
different value on someone else’s life, according to his/her ranking in the society. The 
classic trolley problem presents people with the dilemma, that is, whether to choose to 
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sacrifice the life of one person in order to save the lives of 5 more individuals. 
According to a utilitarian perspective (Baron, 1996; Bennet, 1981) there should not be 
any difference in judging the value of human life. Similarly, pushing someone off the 
bridge should be deemed as equally unacceptable, irrespective of the gender, race, or 
status.  
 Yet, Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris and Fiske (2010) wondered whether people were 
more likely to save pitied, envied or admirable people. At the same time they 
investigated whether it was equally acceptable to sacrifice a homeless, or a rich 
individual to stop the train. Results showed that 69% of the respondent believed it was 
acceptable to sacrifice a low status individual, and 77% of the participants reported that 
it was more acceptable to save five high status people than five low status people. 
 
2.6 Rankings: Theory or social comparison extension? 
 Starting from the social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), authors like Garcia 
and Tor (2007), and Garcia, Tor and Gonzalez (2006), extended the theoretical 
assumptions of Festinger’s approach to study how comparisons, under some 
circumstances, trigger competition and cooperation.  
 Zell and colleagues (2009) further explored the nature of the ranking, showing 
that the same outcome can be interpreted differently according to how the social context 
shapes people’s evaluations of a performance. On the same line, Garcia and Tor (2009) 
suggested that competitive behavior is affected by the size of group, and when the 
number of participants increase the tendency to compete decrease. I also illustrated that, 
oftentimes, hierarchical differences are expressed through more subtle indexes, such as 
facial expressions (Chen et al., 2012). Taken together these findings seem to suggest 
that ranking, and more specifically class-as-rank is a well-defined theoretical approach. 
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Yet, Fiske (2013) claimed that a theory requires processes, outcomes and falsifiable 
assumptions, and she proposed that, although useful in understanding several social 
phenomena, rankings per se’ don't provide evidences on their specific influences and 
effects on people’s conduct. Rather, Fiske (2010) suggested that ranks are useful to 
contrast power and status. While ranks are intrinsically comparative in nature, by 
contrasting people with someone who is better off or worse off, status and power do not 
depend on relative comparisons. Fiske further suggested that status and power are not 
linearly correlated: for example, Quatari citizens perceive their social class as higher 
than the majority of their country’s residence, yet, some of them may have more or less 
power according to the amount of business and investment business income they 
receive (Fiske, 2013).  
The last sentences open the doors for a series of questions in the social domain. More 
specifically, what is the effect of ranking in the economic domain? Do people who have 
larger wealth exhibit higher levels of satisfaction? What is the relationship between 
higher income (and higher status) and subjective well-being? 
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Chapter 3 
Status, Ranking and Subjective Well-Being 
 
3.1 Income and relative comparisons 
 At the beginning of this work I pointed out that one of the most intriguing issues 
in the social domain is the relationship between money and subjective well-being. More 
specifically, although it is true that material possessions are important, many theorists 
are still arguing on whether high status is always positively correlated to happiness. 
According to conventional economics, this assumption should hold true, given that 
money can be exchanged for goods, that in turn, increase subjective utility (Boyce, 
Brown, & Moore, 2010). Such claim is supported by the absolute-income-hypothesis 
that advocates that richer people should be happier than those worse off within the same 
group (Diener, 1984). 
 Yet, research demonstrated that this is not always the case. The assumption that 
money does not buy happiness is rooted in the philosophical literature: Aristotle (384-
322 B.C) in the Nicomean Ethics stated that “the life of money-making is one 
undertaken under compulsion since wealth is not the good we are seeking and is merely 
useful for the sake of something else” [italics added]. Such quote captures the idea that 
there are other factors that, coupled with money, affect well-being. More recently, the 
Easterlin’s paradox showed that national happiness in the United States has not 
increased since 1972, even though gross income had increase by over 40% (Easterlin, 
1974, 1995; Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, & Welzel, 2008). These findings suggested that 
exists a weak positive correlation between higher income and happiness, and prompted 
scholars to elaborate different explanation to solve this paradox. Bok (2010), suggested 
that rich people are happier not because of their higher income, rather because happy 
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people are more successful and this, in turn, lead to higher earnings. It is also possible 
that, although the overall income increased, other social factors negatively affected 
people’s satisfaction, such as higher crime rates, and divorces. However, scholars 
showed no support for this hypothesis, suggesting that the net effect of economic 
growth should overshadow these contextual factors (Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2007). 
 Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) suggested that another possible explanation for the 
weak positive correlation between higher income and well-being lies on the fact that 
only the wealthiest 20% of the American citizens actually benefited from the economic 
growth started in the 1975. Yet, Bok (2010) showed that this was not a plausible 
solution to the paradox, given that overall reported happiness declined from the mid 
‘50s through the mid ’60s, when income were equally raising among all the segments of 
the population.  
 What outlined above suggests that there are other factors capable to affect well-
being and satisfaction, and that the relationship between money and happiness is not 
straightforward. Yet, many scholars agreed that it was important to understand which 
reference points people adopt when evaluating their assets in their own community. Di 
Tella and McCullock (2008) and Luttmer (2005) showed that life satisfaction depended 
on the income of other peers in the same relevant group. It is possible that happiness 
was not linearly increasing because other people’s income was increasing as well (see 
Parducci, 1968). This last assumption is in line with what illustrated in the previous 
chapter. More specifically, research on social comparisons revealed that people compare 
their performance either to the average of their group, or, on the contrary, to that of 
others occupying a specific position. In the economic domain, individuals can choose 
different reference points to evaluate their assets. For example, they can adopt global 
comparisons and perceive themselves as richer or poorer than the average, or select 
 57 
individual comparisons and rank themselves as better off or worse off than specific 
relevant others within their group. On this basis, economists and psychologists 
developed different approaches to better understand which comparisons represent 
significant predictors of happiness, satisfaction, and well-being.  
 The reference-income hypothesis suggests that people adopt aggregate reference 
points to evaluate their performances (Klein, 1997; 2003). In the economic realm, this 
model predicts that individuals care about how their income compares with the norm of 
a comparison group (Boyce et al., 2010; Frank, 1985). According to this approach, 
individuals’ utility increases when their income is greater than the average income of a 
reference group. On the contrary, utility decreases when people’s income falls below the 
average of a reference group.  
 Other approaches highlight the importance of more individual social 
comparisons. Numerous studies suggested that people tend to compare their income to 
that of friends or colleagues at work (Clark & Oswald, 1998; Duesenberry, 1949; 
Oswald, 1983), and that these specific comparisons affected behaviors by different 
ways, like the place where people chose to live and work (Frank, 1985), savings 
behaviors (Childers & Rao, 1992) or decisions to give and help others (Andreoni & 
Scholz, 1998). More importantly, what these models have in common is the importance 
placed on relative rather than absolute comparisons.  
 
3.2 The range frequency theory 
 In the late ‘60s, Parducci (1968) explored whether people were more likely to 
compare their income to the average (the norm) of a relevant group or, on the contrary, 
were more prone to rank themselves in the distribution of all people. Further, he 
investigated the relationship between socioeconomic status and subjective well-being. 
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Parducci (1968) formulated a theoretical approach defined range frequency theory, 
which revealed that individuals adopt both strategies when called upon evaluating their 
income. More specifically, the evaluation of one’s asset is the result of a weighted 
average of two principles; the frequency principle and range principle. According to 
Hagerty (2000) and Parducci (1968), individuals’ subjective well-being (SWB) is 
expressed as follows: 
 
(1) SWBi = wRi + (1 – w) Fi 
 
 
Where Ri  is written as: 
 
(2) Ri = (Ii – min) / (max – min) 
 
Where Ri  is the range for the person i, Ii is the person’s income, min is the smallest 
income in the reference group and max the largest. Ri is a range because it considers the 
largest and the smallest income in a population at a given time.  
On the other hand, the frequency principle is written as follows: 
 
(3) Fi = Ranki / N 
 
 
and considers the position of a person in the entire distribution of all people. More 
specifically, the frequency principle is expressed as the ranking of an individual in a 
group of size N.  
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Parducci’s model (1968; 1995) is important because it entails both the aggregate and the 
individual nature of social comparison. From this approach the author derived different 
assumptions that can account for subjective well-being.  
First, increasing the maximum of the distribution, that is, the largest income in a given 
group, should decrease individual’s well-being. This is because, holding the income 
constant, an increase of the maximum of the distribution corresponds to an increase of 
the range in Equation 1. A second assumption claims that more positively skewed 
distributions of incomes should increase a specific individual’s well-being, as more 
people will be ranked below his personal given income i. The third prediction regards 
the aggregate (group) level of well-being, and states that, contrary to the previous 
assumption, more positive skewed distributions should decrease group well-being. That 
is, when all others’ income increases, a person i could no longer be better off than 
anyone else and her level of happiness will then return to its starting value, as predicted 
by the hedonic treadmill model (Brickman & Campbell, 1971). This assumption is 
important because it entails the conflict between the individual and the group. 
Following Hagerty (2000), it is true that more positively skewed distributions will make 
an individual’s income look better than others’, as more individuals will be ranked 
below her income level. Yet, at the same time, the positive skewness of income 
distribution will push the aggregate group’s average to the lower tie of the distribution, 
thus decreasing the overall well-being. Put it simply, in more positively skewed 
distributions “the group average loses more happiness than the individual gains” 
(Hagerty, 2000, p. 765). 
 Previous research by Diener and Fujita (1997) showed that others’ income in the 
close environment does not seem to affect personal happiness and satisfaction. 
However, Hagerty (2000) suggested “that the income of others affect individual’s 
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subjective well-being”, and that Diener and Fujita’s studies confounded the distribution 
of income with other factors. More specifically, Hagerty (2000) suggested that 
Parducci’s model could be adopted to confirm that both relative and aggregate 
comparisons affect individuals’ well-being. The author cited previous work by Smith, 
Diener, and Wedell (1989) who asked participants to rate their satisfaction with 
gratuities earned at work. In a study participants were shown their own gratuities and 
those of others. According to Parducci’s assumptions, the authors manipulated the 
skewness of the distribution, and showed that satisfaction ratings increased with more 
positively skewed distributions while group satisfaction decreased. These findings 
supported both the frequency and the range principle. Yet, no confirmation of such 
results was found in the field, and Hagerty (2000) suggested that this lack of 
consistency was due to incorrect computations of ranges and skewness in a community.  
 In a field study with 7000 people in the United States, and building on Parducci’s 
range frequency model, Hagerty (2000) showed that the increases in the maximum 
income in a community led to a decline in happiness; further, more positively skewed 
distributions, along with personal income, were positively correlated to happiness and 
well-being. Yet, no effect of the minimum income was found. Hagerty (2000) 
interpreted this finding as a greater tendency to adopt upward comparisons (Festinger, 
1954). To empirically test this prediction, the author controlled for the effects of the 
mean of the 80th percentile income (upper bound) and the 20th percentile income (lower 
bound) within a community, and explored whether they could both account for 
subjective well-being. Both the lower and the upper points of the income distributions 
correlated with reported happiness, indicating that the individuals rated upward and 
downward comparisons equally. Over the last ten years other scholars deepened the 
effects of relative and aggregate comparisons, suggesting that the perception of one’s 
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economic standing does depend on the rank that an individual occupies in a relevant 
group.    
 Boyce and colleagues (2010) further developed Parducci (1968; 1995) and 
Hagerty’s (2000) assumptions, suggesting that only the high rankings predicted 
happiness, whereas income and reference income had no effect. Additionally, the 
authors claimed that previous research adopted the range frequency approach to assess 
general economic satisfaction (Clark, Frijters, & Shields, 2008), whereas no large-scale 
study has examined the effect of ranking on self-reported general satisfaction.  
 Boyce and colleagues (2010) included in their analyses all the British adults from 
1997 to 2004 who answered a life-satisfaction question. Participants answered on a 
seven point Likert scale to the question “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your 
life overall?” (Boyce et al., 2010, p. 472). Results showed that rank income explained 
more of the overall variation in life satisfaction, compared to absolute income. Further, 
when absolute and relative income were entered as predictors of satisfaction, only rank 
income significantly predicted life satisfaction, whereas absolute income accounted for 
no variance.  
 Lastly, the authors examined the relative weight of upward and downward 
comparisons, assessing whether high ranked others had greater impact on individuals’ 
evaluations of relative standing than low ranked others. Building on the subjective 
income rank model (Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 2008), Boyce and colleagues 
(2010) found that the upward comparisons significantly improved the assessment of 
reported satisfaction. These findings contrast with Hagerty’s claim (2000) that people 
rate upward and downward comparisons equally, supporting Duesenberry (1949) and 
Festinger’s (1954) assumption that people are more prone to compare with better others.  
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3.3 Does high status always matter? 
 In the aforementioned studies I illustrated how scholars aimed to understand the 
effects of absolute and relative income on life satisfaction and subjective well-being. 
Yet, results are not always consistent, with some evidence showing only weak 
correlations between greater wealth and happiness, and other highlighting the 
importance of relative rather than absolute comparisons on life satisfaction. One limit of 
this work is that it mainly focused on socioeconomic status as a potential predictor of 
well-being. Yet, socioeconomic status (SES), stresses the importance of material 
possessions, without considering other factors capable to affect people’s satisfaction.  
 A limitations of the studies reviewed above is that scholars mainly focused on the 
solely effect of income on satisfaction and well-being. What is important, though, is to 
be aware that financial success is not the only factors to take into consideration when 
studying happiness. Bok (2010) reported that six prominent factors emerged from 
surveys asking people what aspects of their lives were associated to well-being. 
Marriage (Diener & McGovern, 2008), social relationships (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 
2008), organizations and social groups (Helliwell & Putnam, 2007), employment (see 
Tait, Padgett, & Baldwin, 1989), health (Kates, Greiff, & Hagen, 1990), religion (see 
Ferris, 2002), represent the main factors associated to changes in life satisfactions. 
Others aspects, such as volunteering (Frey & Stutzer, 2005), and the perceived quality 
of one’s government (Inglehart et al., 2008)), have also been demonstrated to positively 
affect happiness. More recently, Anderson and colleagues (2012) suggested that 
sociometric status, instead, would play a greater role in predicting happiness. 
Sociometric status “represents respect and admiration individuals have in their face-to-
face groups, such as among their neighbors, coworkers or classmates” (Anderson et al., 
2012). These authors found that such different form of status has more impact on well-
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being for two reasons. First, it entails local comparisons, whereas socioeconomic status, 
oftentimes, demands more ‘distant’ comparisons (i.e. within one country), second, 
sociometric status is strictly connected to different psychological processes capable to 
affect subjective well-being to a greater extent, such as power and social acceptance 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Moreover, sociometric status is positively correlated with 
autonomy, perceived control and more influence over others’ opinions (Berger, 
Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980). Lastly, individuals with higher sociometric status have 
more friends and are more likely to get included in others’ social activities (Thibault & 
Kelley, 1959). Anderson and colleagues (2012) tested their local-ladder effect in 4 
different studies, suggesting that sociometric status would increase power and social 
acceptance, which in turn would positively affect subjective well-being.  
In a first study the authors adopted an aggregate measure of sociometric status by 
assessing how respected, admired and looked to in their groups participants were 
perceived. The authors also controlled for socioeconomic status, given that prior 
research showed a positive, though weak, correlation with well-being. Well-being was 
assessed through the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 
1985). Results confirmed the hypothesis, showing that sociometric status predicted 
well-being, whereas no effect of socioeconomic status was found. It is possible that in 
the previous study, conducted among college students, the variance of the incomes was 
too little to account for the null effect of socioeconomic status. To this purpose, a 
second study was conducted using a national online sample in order to test the 
robustness of the hypothesis with different levels of income equally distributed. As in 
the first study, socioeconomic and sociometric status were regressed on subjective well-
being. Additionally, personal sense of power and social acceptance (Leary, Tambor, 
Terdal, & Downs, 1995) were measured and entered as mediators of the relationship 
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between sociometric status and subjective well-being. Results showed that sociometric 
status affected subjective well-being through feelings of social acceptance and personal 
sense of power.  
 Previous research by Piff and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that participants’ 
status could also be successfully induced through a priming technique. Participants were 
presented with the McArthurs’ scale (Adler et al., 2000), a measure that depicts a ladder 
with 10 rungs, each representing people’s perceived ranking in the society. Anderson 
and colleagues (2012) adopted the same measure to manipulate participants’ 
sociometric status in a third study. Those assigned to the high sociometric status 
condition were asked to compare themselves in terms of respect, admiration and 
influence, to people at the very bottom rung of the ladder. They were also told that those 
persons had no respect, admiration and influence in all of their important social groups.  
On the contrary, those in the low sociometric status were told to read the same scenario 
and to compare themselves to people who had “a great deal of respect, admiration and 
influence” in their social groups. High and low socioeconomic status was induced in a 
similar way, that is, by asking participants to compare to others with high (lower) 
wealth, education and job status. Results showed that only sociometric status had a 
significant effect on well-being, and that this effect was even stronger among high 
sociometric status participants. The effects of sociometric status were also 
longitudinally tested in a fourth study in which Andersons and colleagues (2012), using 
a sample of one hundred fifty-six M.B.A students, showed that as the students’ 
sociometric status rose or fell after graduation, their reported well-being rose or fell 
accordingly.  
 The studies reviewed above demonstrated that relying exclusively on economic 
status is not sufficient to explain variations in participants’ well-being. Rather, they 
 65 
suggest that different psychological factors have more influence on life satisfaction. 
Respect, admiration, power, and acceptance are likely to contribute to a peson’s well-
being, and such results are in line with the idea that material possessions per se’ have 
little impact, and they rather serve as means by which people can achieve a higher 
psychological standing in their group.  
 Recently, other authors explored the direct effects of power on happiness. Kifer, 
Heller, Perunovic, and Galinsky (2012) referred to previous work by Gruenfeld and 
colleagues (2008) and Anderson and colleagues (2012) stating that power entails control 
over other individuals or resources in social relationships; a form of control that can be 
perceived as contextual (i.e., being the boss in the workplace) or more dispositional. 
Importantly, Kifer and colleagues (2012) suggested a key distinction between striving 
for power and having power. The former entails the pursuit of greater resources, which 
similarly to the pursuit of greater wealth, does not always increase satisfaction, often 
leading to an increase in negative feelings (Emmons, 1991). On the contrary, having 
power triggers personal authenticity (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). This is because 
power decreases the dependence on other people, thus guaranteeing the possibility to 
satisfy personal needs and goals without anyone else’s support (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003). This, in turn, leads to higher subjective well-being. Putting all 
together, Kifer and colleagues (2012) suggested that having power would increase well-
being through feelings of authenticity. In a first study the authors measured perceived 
power in three different domains: the workplace, romantic relationships, and 
friendships. Power and well-being were assessed trough the Sense of Power Scale, and 
the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Anderson et al., 2012, Diener, et al., 1985) 
respectively, while authenticity was measured through the Fleeson and Wilt’s (2010) 
three item authenticity scale. Results showed that power increased well-being, and this 
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held true in the three different domains (work, romantic relationships, and friendships). 
Furthermore, people with higher power reported more positive emotions and less 
negative emotions. Mediation analyses revealed that power was no longer a significant 
predictor of well-being when feelings of authenticity were entered in the model. 
To extend these findings Kifer and colleauges (2012) conducted two separate studies to 
test the different paths, that is, the relationship between power and authenticity, and the 
link between authenticity and well-being. High or low power was induced by asking 
participants to write about a time in which they encountered  “a situation in which they 
controlled (did not control) the ability of another person to get something they wanted” 
(Kifer et al., 2012, p. 285). Subsequent analyses revealed that power was positively 
correlated with sense of authenticity, which in turn increased well-being. Boostrapping 
analyses revealed that authenticity mediated the relationship between power and well-
being. To test the direct effect of authenticity on well-being, the authors induced higher 
or lower authenticity by asking participants to recall a time in which they felt authentic 
or unauthentic. The manipulation was successful, indicating that individuals in the high 
authenticity condition reported feeling more authentic. Furthermore, the same 
participants exhibited greater well-being, thus supporting the direct and causal effect of 
authenticity on subjective well-being.  
 The results of these studies are critical as they shed light on different factors 
capable to affect life satisfaction other than material possessions. The distinction 
between striving for power and having power is important, as it suggests that only once 
powers is acquired internalized feelings of self-fulfillment can actually lead to higher 
satisfaction. Striving for power is extrinsic in nature and research showed that these 
aspirations are negatively correlated to subjective well-being (Kasser & Ryan, 1996). 
Similarly, the merely pursuit of wealth is associated to unhappiness and disappointment 
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(Kasser & Kanner, 2004), and this is because attaching greater importance to economic 
achievement may make people forget about other important social factors such as 
human relationships and family life (Bok, 2010). Lastly, the continuous pursuit of 
happiness through income is doomed to failure, as predicted by the hedonic treadmill 
model (Brickman & Campbell, 1971). 
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Chapter 4 
 
Overview of the experiments  
 
 
  The first chapter described the core tenet of the social comparison processes 
theory (Festinger, 1954), and illustrated that, when evaluating skills, opinions or 
abilities, individuals tend to compare with others that are perceived as similar on 
relevant dimensions. These comparisons can occur either upward or downward (Collins, 
1996; Wills, 1981). Upward comparisons communicate that the person is among the 
best achievers (Wheeler, 1966), yet, on many occasions, they can also represent a threat 
to the individual, for example, making salient one’s failures and limits (see also 
Gibbons, 1986; Major, Schiaccitano, & Crocker, 1983; Wheeler, & Miyake, 1992). 
Downward comparisons, on the contrary, entail evaluations with someone who is worse 
off. For instance, a student can compare her performance to that of others who received 
a worse grade. These types of comparisons bear positive consequences for the self 
(Buunk et al., 2001; Collins, 1996; Wills, 1981), with repercussions on self-esteem and 
well-being.  
 The role of the social context is also important in imposing and shaping different 
social comparisons. Buckingham and Alicke (2002) revealed that individuals can 
perceive themselves as better or worse than the average, thus adopting aggregate 
comparisons, or, in other occasions, they can compare with single others in a given 
group, thus selecting relative comparisons. Klein (1997; 2003) showed that aggregate 
comparisons are more diagnostic and informative, because they are based on the mean 
of a population, and Buckingham and Alicke (2002) extended these findings suggesting 
that only when a co-actor is not present, aggregate comparison are better indicator of 
one’s performance. 
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 In the second chapter I illustrated how people adopt aggregate and relative 
comparisons when they are provided information about their position (ranking) among 
other peers. Rankings are pervasive in our society, and highlight the importance of 
one’s standing in different domains (i.e. the classroom, the workplace, one’s sport 
team). Providing information about how one performs compared to others in one of 
these different contexts is important. A person can be the top ranked, the bottom ranked, 
or stand in the middle of the distribution, and this allows for the adoption of different 
benchmarks when evaluating her performance or assets. Ranking as second best entails 
two different reference points (March & Shapira, 1992). On the one hand, a person is 
better than the average, whereas on the other hand, it also means that she is worse than 
the top ranked. The presence of different benchmarks at the same time affects 
individuals’ emotional responses as well. For instance, a person who is in the second 
position can draw positive feelings from performing above the average, but at the same 
time, the comparison with the top ranked individual can communicate that her skills and 
abilities are not as good as someone else’s. Such feedback makes more salient limits 
and failures that, in turn, instill feelings of inferiority and envy (Fiske, 2013). 
 Although it seems safe to suggest that comparisons with better off individuals can 
be painful for people’s self-concept (Gibbons, 1986; Major, Schiaccitano, & Crocker, 
1983; Wheeler, & Miyake, 1992), under some circumstances, they can result in positive 
consequences. Research by Testa and Major (1990) revealed that lower ranked 
individuals tend to seek for upward comparisons and are motivated to increase their 
score when they believe that they have control on their actions. The second chapter also 
illustrated the behavioral consequences of different ranking conditions. Garcia and 
colleagues (2006) and Garcia and Tor (2007) revealed that rankings enhance 
competition and decrease cooperation among peers, and that these responses are more 
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likely to occur in proximity to the top of the bottom of a ranking, compared to when 
individuals stand in the middle of the group. Poortvliet and colleagues (2009) extended 
these findings and showed that people’s goal orientation (mastery vs. approach) mediate 
the relationship between different rankings and cooperative behavior. More specifically, 
the authors’ findings revealed that mastery goals individuals were more likely to 
cooperate when low ranked, whereas performance goals individuals exhibited more 
selfish behavior both when high and low ranked.  
 Finally, the third chapter illustrated the implications of social comparisons in the 
economic domain, in order to investigate the relationship between high rankings and 
well-being. Building on seminal work by Parducci (1968, 1995), Hagerty (2000) and 
Boyce and colleagues (2010), provided evidences that rank, rather than absolute income 
levels, was a stronger predictor or life satisfaction. Recent work by Anderson and 
colleagues (2013) further investigated the relationship between ranking and well-being, 
showing that that sociometric status, rather than socioeconomic status, had a positive 
impact on reported satisfaction. 
 Taken together, the findings emerged so far suggest that a) different sources of 
comparison affect the evaluation of personal assets, b) people strive to reach a higher 
standing in their relevant group, and c) rankings increase competition, especially in 
proximity to relevant standards. Based on these assumptions I propose that research on 
social comparisons and rankings can also be applied to explore economic scenarios in 
which participants can increase their status by exploiting ambiguous and unclear 
situations. These scenarios entail different behaviors and strategies that can lie on the 
boundaries of ethicality. Consider a person using the same bus ticket twice as the ticket 
collector forgot to clip it on the first ride. In this scenario, this person is facing a 
dilemma: she knows that she ought to pay for every ride, but, at the same time, she finds 
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herself with the opportunity to save on the price of a new ticket. Moreover, she can also 
feel less responsible for her actions displacing her responsibility to the ticket collector 
(see Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991).  
 Another domain where individuals face the opportunity to improve their status, 
sometimes without breaching any norm, is tax evasion. Entrepreneurs can look for 
loopholes in the system for the benefits of their own business and to reduce their total 
tax liability. For instance, the so-called “carousel fraud” phenomenon in Britain entails 
the purchase of goods value-added tax (VAT) free in other countries, and then sell the 
same goods to local customers, charging them VAT.  
 Kirchler, Maciejovsky, and Schneider (2003), illustrated that, tax avoidance, tax 
flight, and tax evasion, although bearing the same negative consequences on national 
budget, were perceived differently by individuals. While tax evasion and tax flight were 
perceived as negative and immoral, tax avoidance was associated with less negative 
attributes. The majority of the sample rated tax avoidance as ‘fair’, as to indicate that 
exploring possible loopholes in the system in order to reduce the tax burden is not as 
immoral as evading taxes.  
 Yet, it is important to recognize that tax evasion represents a more complex 
social behavior, in which the interplay of different sources, like the perception of 
authorities (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008) and perceived fairness (Etzioni, 1986) 
affect individuals’ choice to comply. Tax evasion can be linked to previous research on 
social comparisons and rankings, as individuals compare their wealth to that of relevant 
others when facing the opportunity to reduce their total liability. Further, in line with 
Parducci’s model (1968), people can adopt different reference points when comparing 
their incomes. High-income people are more likely to interact with other high-income 
citizens who serve as a comparison for their wealth and status. Therefore, high-income 
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citizens can easily find someone who is richer, whereas they are unlikely to engage in 
comparisons with those whose wealth is much lower. Additionally, the connection 
between high status and tax evasion (Ali, Cecil & Knoblett, 2001; Pommerehne, Weck-
Hanneman, 1996) is reflected in field experiments showing higher level of unethical 
behavior among high status individuals (Piff et al., 2012). These findings suggest that 
high rankings increase competition and selfish behaviors not only in experimental 
settings but also in real life. 
 Based on these assumptions I built three experiments with the goal of exploring 
the role of different social comparisons on people’s pursuit of wealth. More specifically, 
I created the opportunity to exploit ambiguous economic situations, and, to a lower 
extent, cheat to increase one’s payoff. This last point is relevant, as it represents an 
important contribution of this work. While previous research demonstrated the effects 
of status and ranking on cooperation and competition, here, I extend these findings 
investigating how individuals’ standing affect the disposition to take advantage of ‘grey 
areas’.  
 Participants took part in a task in which they had the opportunity to win an 
amount of money based on their performance. Across five experimental blocks, a set of 
matrices was randomly displayed on the computer screen. Some of these matrices were 
associated to a higher payoff, whereas some were associated to a lower payoff, and 
participants were instructed to press the button associated to each of the two types of 
matrices. To create the opportunity of exploiting ambiguous situations, some trials 
presented both the higher and the lower payoff matrix at the same time. Yet, 
participants could select only one payoff, thus facing the dilemma of choosing 
consistently the higher or the lower payoff. Although the standard economic approach 
suggests that people should always maximize their payoffs (Von Neuamann & 
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Morgenstern, 1944), descriptive theories of individuals’ behavior revealed that people’ 
choices are affected by several factors, such as biases, heuristics and perception of one’s 
standing in the economic ranking, that do not always lead to the maximization of the 
outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For instance, 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) showed that taxpayers who expected a refund were 
less likely to adopt strategies to reduce their taxable income, than those who expected 
an extra payment. Similarly, in the context of this work, I propose that the tendency to 
exploit ambiguous situations depends on factors other than the exclusive motivation to 
maximize one’s outcome. Building on previous research on social comparisons, I 
suggest that different feedback about one’s standing within a relevant group affect 
participants’ economic behavior.  
 Experiment 1 tests the effect of aggregate feedback by contrasting participants 
ranking above and below the average. In a between subject experiment, participants 
were told that at the end of each of the experimental blocks, their earning would be 
compared to the average earning of a group of students who took part in the same 
experiment in previous sessions. Based on the literature suggesting that individuals aim 
to reduce the distance between themselves and similar others, and that upward 
comparisons have a positive effects on individuals self-views (Collins, 2000; Festinger, 
1954; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Suls, 1977) I hypothesized that: 
 
H1) Participants consistently ranking below the average (low status) should be more 
likely to maximize their payoffs when facing ambiguous situations, compared to those 
whose scores are consistently above the group average (high status). 
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H2) Participants consistently scoring below the average (low status) should obtain a 
higher cumulative payoff than those scoring above the average (high status).  
 
 Support for this prediction is also rooted in previous work by Buckingham and 
Alicke (2002), who suggested that when no other specific other is present, aggregate 
feedback represents a diagnostic and informative source of comparison (Klein, 1997; 
2003). Further, low status participants will perceive themselves in the negative domain, 
as the outcomes fall consistently below the group standard domain (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). This in turn should trigger more risky behavior (Cameron & Miller, 
2009), and motivated participants to exploit any possible loophole in the system to 
increase their standing and recover from the loss.  
 Conversely, high status participants should be less motivated to exploit these 
ambiguous situations. This is because consistently achieving above the average 
performance should lead participants to perceive their standing in the positive frame 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Further, providing feedback that does not make explicit 
the actual score achieved by others may lead participants to think that they are among 
the high achievers in the high status group, regardless of their actual rank within that 
group. As a consequence, the awareness itself of being among the “winners” should 
lessen the will to exploit situations that might be perceived as almost unethical. 
Experiment 1 tested both H1 and H2. 
 Experiment 2 was built on Experiment 1 and adopted the same experimental 
procedure, yet with an important difference. In Experiment 2 participants were told that 
their performance at the end of each experimental block would be compared to that of 
other students who participated in a previous session of the same experiment. More 
specifically, half of participants received a constant feedback, at the end of each block, 
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informing that they were ranking second in a group of five. The other half of 
participants, instead, was told, after each block, that they were ranking fourth in a group 
of five. By doing so, participants ranking 2nd were better than the average but worse 
than the top ranked student at the same time. Similarly, participants ranking 4th were 
worse than the average but better than the last ranked student at the same time. Such 
manipulation induced different reference points, and previous work suggested that 
individuals are capable to adopt different benchmarks when evaluating outcomes and 
possible behaviors (Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999; Lopes & Oden, 1999; March, 1988; 
March & Shapira, 1992; Ordóñez, Connolly, & Coughlan, 2000; Sullivan & Kida, 
1995). 
 More importantly, to the purpose of this work, Experiment 2 introduced rankings, 
therefore individuals were able to adopt relative comparisons with similar others 
occupying a specific position in the group. This resembles Parducci’s range-frequency 
theory (Parducci, 1968; 1995), given that participants could determine both their 
position within the group and, at the same time, compare to the average performance of 
the group.  
 Building on literature suggesting that individuals will be more likely to engage in 
competitive behavior in proximity to the top and the bottom of the ranking (Garcia et 
al., 2006; Garcia & Tor, 2007), and on work showing that falling consistently short of a 
goal (in this case being the top ranked) increased risky behavior (Ordóñez, Schweitzer, 
Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), I hypothesized that:     
 
H3) Second best and second last participants should exhibit a greater tendency over 
time to maximize their payoffs when facing ambiguous situations.  
 76 
 Further support for this prediction derives from previous research suggesting that 
social comparisons enhance the salience of possible alternative outcomes, thus shifting 
the relative salience of the status quo (Boles & Messick, 1995). In other words, even 
high-status participants should exploit the chances they have to get richer if they 
compare themselves to the participant who achieved the best performance rather than to 
those who are worse off. Such a viewpoint may resemble several real world phenomena. 
For instance, media and advertisement use this powerful leverage to promote the idea 
that everyone could be a winner and can make a dream come true, oftentimes at any 
cost.   
 However, an alternative explanation is that participants ranking always 2nd will 
perceive the foregone loss of not being the first ranked as more salient than those 
assigned to the second-last condition, for whom reaching the top of the rank is clearly 
not possible. For this reason it is also possible to hypothesize that: 
 
H4) Second best and second last participants should differ in their tendency to 
maximize their payoffs. More specifically, second best participants should exhibit a 
higher disposition to increase their earnings over time compared to second last 
participants.  
 
 The emphasis put on achieving greater goals leads towards comparisons with 
better others and causes people to adopt any strategy to increase their assets even when 
this entails the exploitation of loopholes to reach the top. Yet, this race may have no 
end, as most people will always fall short compared to the assets accumulated by others 
(see Brickman & Campbell, 1971). Such behavior is also common in many 
organizational settings, from top business managers constantly striving to find ways to 
 77 
improve dividends and financial assets, to big corporate scandals like Enron and Ford 
that showed how the need to outperform the company's strategic goals led to serious 
injuries and unethical behavior (Gino & Margolis, 2011; Ordóñez, et al., 2009). 
Experiment 2 tested H3 and H4. Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 aimed to manipulate 
the role of feedback about participants’ standing in a relevant group. Experiment 1 
adopted an aggregate source of comparison (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002), whereas 
Experiment 2 introduced rankings and provided more precise information about 
participants’ standing thus making individual comparisons more salient.  
 Experiment 3 was built on Experiment 2, yet with two important differences. It 
was developed to compare high status’ participants in a between subject design where 
half of the participants received feedback informing that they were consistently 
performing better than the average (like in Experiment 1), whereas the other half 
received feedback informing that they were ranking 1st within a group of five students.  
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 employed the same feedback manipulation to directly 
compare high and low status participants’ economic behavior. The purpose of 
Experiment 3 was to compare only high status participants across two different 
conditions in which the nature of feedback was experimentally manipulated (aggregate 
vs. ranking). This is important because it allows for a better understanding of the 
exclusive effect of feedback on the tendency to improve one’s payoffs among ‘the best 
achievers’ and ‘best achievers’. Based on previous work by Garcia and colleagues 
(2006), and Garcia and Tor (2007), showing that rankings increase competition, 
especially in proximity to relevant standards (in this case, the top), I hypothesized that: 
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H5) Participants ranking 1st should be more prone to maximize their payoffs across 
blocks, showing a greater tendency to maximize ambiguous situations, compared to 
participants ranking above the average. 
 
 A limitation of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 is that both experiments did not 
provide any measure of possible processes underlying the tendency to maximize one’s 
payoff. Thus, Experiment 3 introduced a measure to better understand participants’ 
economic behavior. More specifically, I hypothesized that the perceived precision of 
one’s position within the group would affect the motivation to increase one’s wealth. I 
also hypothesized that participants ranking 1st, who are provided with an explicit 
ranking and have the opportunity to adopt specific relative comparisons, would perceive 
the information about their standing as more precise than participants who were simply 
informed to be above the average. Therefore I hypothesized that: 
 
H6) The perceived precision of the feedback relative to one’s standing within the group 
should mediate the relationship between condition (above the average vs. always 1st) 
and the tendency to maximize monetary payoffs, with greater perceived precision 
associated to higher amount of money earned across the experimental blocks. 
 
 To summarize, the purpose of this work is to test the effects of different social 
comparisons (aggregate vs. ranking) on economic situations in which individuals have 
the opportunity to take advantage of unclear rules to increase their payoffs. Moreover, 
previous research mainly explored participants’ behavioral responses to different 
ranking manipulations through hypothetical scenarios (Garcia et al., 2006; Garcia & 
Tor, 2007). In this work I introduce a behavioral paradigm that taps participants’ actual 
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choices in a real economic situation. Whereas prior studies manipulated participants’ 
status by providing bogus feedback about their performances, in the paradigm adopted 
in the following experiments, participants’ scores reflected their actual behavior. Yet, it 
is important to notice that to lead participants believe that their status was either high or 
low, the score of the group (Experiment 1) and of the other participants (Experiment 2 
and Experiment 3) was experimentally manipulated.  
Furthermore, the three experiments described here measure participants’ actual behavior 
over time, while previous work focused on comparisons that arise from one-shot 
situations (Zell & Alicke, 2009a). 
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Chapter 5 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Above vs. Below the average 
 
 
 
5.1 Method 
 5.1.1 Participants. A total of 40 individuals (63% female; mean age 23 ± 3 
years) participated in Experiment 1 completing a computer-based task. The 
experimental procedure took about 30 minutes. 
 
 5.1.2 Materials and procedure. E-prime 1.2 software was used for the computer 
task. Participants repeated the same procedure for a total of 5 experimental blocks (plus 
a shorter training block). In each block, they were presented with 21 square matrices 
containing eight asterisks and a ninth figure representing either a triangle or a square. 
Matrices were randomly displayed on the computer screen (CRT Monitor, 60Hz refresh 
rate). Specifically, out of the 21 matrices, 7 contained the square, 7 contained the 
triangle and 7 matrices, unexpected by participants, included both the square and the 
triangle (and only seven asterisks). Responses were recorded with the keyboard and 
participants were instructed to press the 'L' button every time the matrix included a 
square and the 'A' button every time it included a triangle. Also, they were informed that 
for each click on the 'L' button they would gain €0.50, whereas for each click on the 'A' 
button they would earn €0.05. Additionally, they were told that they would receive 
feedback about their partial and cumulative earnings at the end of each trial (see Figure 
1). By doing so they were able to acquire information about their performance over 
time. Participants received no instructions about how to answer to the 7 ambiguous 
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matrices when both the square and the triangle were displayed. However, only one 
answer was possible and they had to choose whether to press the button associated to 
the higher payoff or the button associated to the lower payoff. Thus, these trials 
presented a chance to construe ambiguous and unexpected situations in a self-serving 
manner, whenever participants had a motivation to improve their status. In order to let 
participants ponder on their choices, and to limit errors due to time pressure, each 
matrix was displayed for 1500ms, and keyboard responses were recorded only after 
100ms of stimuli onset.  
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Figure 1. Scheme of the experimental procedure 
 
Before the beginning of the computer task, participants were informed that at the 
end of each of the 5 experimental blocks, their cumulative score would be compared to 
the average earning of a group of participants who undertook the same experiment. 
Importantly, earnings reflected actual participants’ performances and in order to induce 
participants to perceive themselves as either high or low status individuals, only the 
group score was manipulated. Therefore, regardless of their actual performance, 
participants assigned to the high-status condition were always told that they scored 
above the average, whereas participants assigned to the low-status condition were 
always told they scored below. By doing this, I was able to manipulate participants’ 
status (high vs. low) in order to compare the tendency to benefit from ambiguous trials 
across low and high status participants.  
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Since our department only allowed to pay a fixed amount of money, I negotiated 
the possibility to use two different payoffs to incentivize participants to perceive a 
difference between high and low reward button. Therefore, I was obliged to give 
participants either a high or a low amount of money depending on their average 
earnings across the 5 blocks. Before the beginning of the computer task participants 
were told that those who achieved an average earning above the cut-off value of €7.5 
would gain €10, whereas those who had an average performance falling below the cut-
off of €7.5 gained €5. Therefore, the economic incentive was the same for everyone 
regardless the experimental condition and the feedback they received. In order to avoid 
any influence caused by the experimenter, participants were left alone in the laboratory 
for the duration of the computer task.  
 
5.2 Results 
 5.2.1 Amount of money earned across blocks 
 Figure 2 shows the average amount of money earned across the 5 blocks. A 2 
(condition: high vs. low status) X 5 (blocks) analysis of variance with the amount of 
money earned across 5 experimental blocks as the dependent variable revealed a 
significant interaction between condition and blocks, F(1, 152) = 4.52, p < .01, η2partial = 
.11. No significant effects of blocks and condition were found (p = .11, p = .40, 
respectively). 
 Separate analysis showed a significant effect of blocks in the low-status 
condition, F(4, 76) = 4.62, p < .01, η2partial = .20, whereas the effect was only marginally 
significant for high-status participants, F(4, 76) = 2.07, p = .09. Planned contrasts 
revealed a significantly higher amount of money earned in blocks 3, 4 and 5 compared 
to block 1 in the low-status condition  (p < .02 for each comparison), whereas in the 
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high status condition the amount earned was significantly lower in block 5 compared to 
block 1 (p < .04). As shown in Table 1, contrasts effects between conditions revealed 
that the amount of money earned in block 1 did not differ between low and high status 
participants, t(38), = -1.12, p = .27, whereas, in block 5, low-status participants earned a 
significantly higher amount of money than participants in the high-status condition, 
t(38) = 2.04, p < .05.  
 
Table 1. Amount of money earned by participants in the two experimental conditions 
across the five blocks of Experiment 1. 
 
Blocks Low Status High Status  95% CI 
 M  SD M SD LL UL 
Block 1 6.55 1.09 6.90 .88 -.98 .38 
Block 2 6.96 1.28 6.85 1.35 -.73 .96 
Block 3 7.24 .99 6.89 1.78 -.58 1.27 
Block 4 7.33 1.05 6.78 1.54 -.30 1.38 
Block 5 7.23 1.12 6.34 1.59 .01 1.77 
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Figure 2. Amount of money (in Euro) earned across the five experimental blocks 
 
 
 5.2.2 Ambiguous trials 
 A 2 (condition: high vs. low status) X 5 (blocks) analysis of variance with the 
number of times participants chose the button associated to the higher payoff when 
presented with ambiguous trials as dependent variable revealed a significant interaction 
between condition and blocks, F(4, 152) = 8.09, p < .01, η2partial = .17. No significant 
effects of blocks and condition were found (p = .31, p = .17, respectively). Separate 
analyses showed a significant effect of blocks in the low status condition, F(4, 76) = 
4.52, p < .05, η2partial = .19, and in the high status condition, F(4, 76) = 4.81, p < .05, 
η2partial = .21. 
 Planned contrasts revealed a significant increase in tendency to choose the button 
associated to the higher payoff in blocks 3, 4 and 5 compared to block 1 in the low-
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status condition  (p < .05 for each comparison), whereas participants in the high status 
condition significantly decreased their tendency to maximize their payoff in blocks 3, 4 
and 5 compared to block 1 (p < .05 for each comparison). 
 Contrasts effects between conditions showed that low status participants 
exhibited a marginally greater tendency to exploit ambiguous situations than high status 
participants in block 3, (respectively, M = 6.25, SD =1.48; M = 5.10, SD = 2.29), t(38) 
= 1.88, p = .06, and a significant tendency to maximize their payoffs in block 4,  
(respectively, M = 6.40, SD =1.60; M = 4.95, SD = 2.62), t(38) = 2.11, p <.05, and in 
block 5, (respectively, M = 6.15, SD =1.84; M = 4.30, SD = 2.70), t(38) = 2.53, p < .05.  
 
 5.2.3 Further analyses  
 I carried out the same ANOVA with the number of times participants chose the 
button associated to the higher payoff when presented with matrices containing the 
square as dependent variable. No main effect of blocks and condition was found 
(respectively, p = .91 and p = .15) and the interaction between blocks and condition did 
not reach significance (p = .56). Finally, I run the same analysis with the number of 
times participants chose the button associated to the higher payoff when presented with 
matrices containing the triangle. Results showed that participants' behavior did not vary 
over the five blocks (p = .26) and no difference across conditions emerged (p = .50). 
Lastly, the interaction between blocks and condition did not reach significance (p = 
.18). 
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5.3 Discussion 
 
 The goal of Experiment 1 was to test the effects of aggregate feedback on 
participants’ motivation to increase their status and earnings when facing situations in 
which it was possible to choose either a higher or a lower payoff and no rule was 
provided. Results showed that participants adopted others’ score as a reference point 
(Rick & Loewenstein, 2008), and this, in turn, affected their disposition to choose the 
higher payoff when presented with ambiguous matrices More specifically, individuals 
led to believe that they were consistently scoring above the average, showed a lower 
tendency to maximize their payoffs over time. On the contrary, those below the average 
increased the number of times they chose the highest payoff when facing the ambiguity, 
thus confirming H1.  
 These findings are supported by previous literature on social comparison theory 
(Festinger, 1954), suggesting that people compare to relevant others when evaluating 
their abilities, and, in this case, their assets. The fact that participants were comparing 
themselves over time to the average score of other students, who undertook the same 
experimental task in a previous session, might have increased the perceived closeness 
and similarity with the target. While expecting to be different causes contrast (Manis & 
Paskewitz, 1984), similarity enhances assimilation, that, in the context of this 
experiment prompted participants below the average to try and be as good as their peers. 
Furthermore, when people hold the belief that they could obtain the same status as the 
target, assimilation is usually even stronger (Buunk et al., 1990; Lockwood & Kunda, 
1997; Suls et al., 2002). In Experiment 1 this was particularly relevant for two reasons. 
First, comparisons occurred over time (Zell & Alicke, 2009a), thus providing several 
opportunities to increase participants’ status. Second, individuals were free to choose 
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the best strategy to improve their earnings, having complete control over the outcomes 
of their own behavior. 
 Participants performing consistently above the average, on the contrary, exploited 
ambiguous trials to a lower extent. Although no direct measures of fulfillment and 
satisfaction were assessed, building on previous literature suggesting that downward 
comparisons increase well-being and carry positive effects to individuals (see Collins, 
1996; Wills, 1981), it is possible to conclude that participants above the average drew 
more satisfaction from their positive standing over time, placing less weight on the mere 
maximization of monetary incentives. These results are also in line with previous work 
by Wills (1981), suggesting that the ambiguity of more general feedbacks lead people to 
obtain a more favorable perception of their status, with greater well-being and self-
enhancement. 
 In the context of Experiment 1, comparing with the mean performance of a large 
group of student led participants above the average to perceive themselves among the 
best achievers, and in turn lessen the pursuit of greater wealth. 
Taken together, the results that emerged in Experiment 1 revealed that people do not 
always maximize their monetary payoffs, even when doing so does not entail breaking 
any rule. This is in contrast with normative approaches (Von Neaumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944) suggesting how individuals should always maximize the outcome 
of their choices. On the contrary, our manipulation showed that simply informing 
participants that they were performing better than the average was sufficient to reduce 
the likelihood to take advantage of unclear economic scenarios. Experiment 1 represents 
a first step towards the understanding of those mechanisms capable to modulate 
people’s economic behavior over time when in presence of other individuals who serve 
as reference points. Experiment 2 will test whether being above the average (a high 
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status individual) is sufficient to limit the tendency to exploit grey areas. Further, it will 
introduce different ranking manipulations, to provide participants with more detailed 
information about their performance over time. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Second-Best vs. Second-Last 
 
 
 
6.1 Method 
 6.1.1 Participants. 40 students participated in the experimental task (53% 
female; mean age 24 ± 3 years). As in Experiment 1 the experimental session lasted 
about 30 minutes. 
 
 6.1.2 Materials and procedure. Procedure and stimuli were identical to 
Experiment 1. However in Experiment 2 participants were told that at the end of each 
block their cumulative scores would be compared to those of other four students who 
underwent the same experiment in a previous session. The purpose of this manipulation 
was to control the exact position of each participant in a group and provide them their 
ranking among similar others. Participants were randomly assigned to two experimental 
conditions. In the second-best conditions participants ranked consistently second in a 
group of five, whereas in the second-last condition participants were informed that they 
were consistently ranking 4th in a group of five students. In order to compare 
participants’ behavior, score distribution was controlled in both conditions across the 
five experimental blocks. More specifically, I kept the distance between the second best 
participant’s score and the third ranked participant’s score equal to the distance between 
the second-last participant’s score and the third last participant’s score. Similarly, the 
distance between the first ranked and the second-best participant’s score was kept equal 
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to the distance between the second-last participant and the last ranked participant in the 
group.  
 Such manipulation allowed to explore the influence of two different social 
reference points simultaneously. That is, second-best participants were consistently 
better than the average, but at the same time, worse than the top ranked individual. 
Similarly, second-last participants were consistently better than the last ranked 
participant, but at the same time, worse than the average. The reward system was 
identical to Experiment 1. Participants were informed that those who achieved an 
average earning above the cut-off value of €7.5 would gain €10, whereas those who had 
an average performance falling below the cut-off of €7.5 gained €5. As in Experiment 1 
the incentive was the same for all individuals, irrespective of the conditions they were 
assigned to. Lastly, as in Experiment 1, the experimenter left participants alone in the 
laboratory for the duration of the computer task.  
 
6.2 Results  
 6.2.1 Amount of money earned across blocks 
A 2 (second-best vs. second-last) X 5 (blocks) analysis of variance with the 
amount of money earned across the five blocks as the dependent variable showed a 
significant effect of blocks, F(4, 152) = 4.55, p < .05, η2partial = .11. The interaction 
between condition and blocks did not reach significance (p = .32), nor did the main 
effect of condition (F < 1, p= .74). 
 Planned contrasts revealed a significantly higher amount of money earned in 
blocks 4 and 5, compared to block 1 (p < .05 for each comparison). Table 2 shows the 
average amount of money earned by second-best and second-last participants across the 
5 experimental blocks.  
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Table 2. Amount of money earned by participants in the two experimental conditions 
across the five blocks of Experiment 2. 
 
Blocks Second Best Second Last 
 M  SD M SD 
Block 1 7.21 1.07 6.98 .95 
Block 2 7.10 1.21 7.28 1.16 
Block 3 7.23 1.45 7.50 1.47 
Block 4 7.25 1.46 7.66 1.47 
Block 5 7.71 1.75 7.70 1.29 
 
 
 6.2.2 Ambiguous trials 
 In order to explore the tendency to take advantage of ambiguous situations across 
the two experimental conditions, I performed a 2 (condition: second-best vs. second-
last) X 5 (blocks) analysis of variance with the number of times participants chose the 
button associated to the higher payoff when presented with ambiguous trials as 
dependent variable. No main effect of blocks was found (F < 1, p = .45), and the 
interaction between condition and blocks did not reach significance (F < 1, p = .86). No 
difference across condition was found (p = .52), showing that second last and second 
best participants did not differ in the tendency to maximize their tally when presented 
with the 7 ambiguous matrices. Table 3 reports the average number of times that 
second-best and second-last participants chose the higher payoff when presented with 
ambiguous matrices. 
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Table 3. Number of times participants chose the higher payoff button when presented 
with ambiguous trials in the two experimental conditions across the five blocks of 
Experiment 2. 
 
Blocks Second Best Second Last 
 M  SD M SD 
Block 1 5.90 1.86 6.00 1.89 
Block 2 5.80 1.90 6.15 1.66 
Block 3 5.95 2.04 6.25 1.51 
Block 4 5.95 2.19 6.35 1.09 
Block 5 6.00 2.05 6.50 .76 
 
 
 6.2.3 Further analyses  
 The same analysis was carried out for the number of times participants chose the 
button associated to the higher payoff when presented with matrices containing the 
square as dependent variable. No main effect of blocks and condition was found (F < 1, 
p > .35), and the interaction between blocks and condition did not reach significance (p 
= .70). The same ANOVA revealed a main effect of blocks when participants chose the 
button associated to the higher payoff when presented with matrices containing the 
triangle, F(4, 152) = 3.74, p < .05, η2partial = .09. No difference between conditions was 
found (F < 1, p = .94) and both second last and second best participants exhibited a 
tendency to claim a higher reward when the low payoff matrices were displayed. 
Planned contrasts revealed that these results depended mainly on participants’ behavior 
toward the end of the computer task. Both groups claimed a significant higher amount 
of money when presented with a triangle in block 5 compared to block 1 (p < .05).  
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6.3 Discussion 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate participants’ tendency to exploit 
ambiguous situations across two different ranking conditions. In the first condition 
participants ranked always 2nd within a group of 5 students. In the second condition 
participants received feedback at the end of each block informing them that they were 
consistently ranking as second-last within a group of 5 students. Results showed that 
participants in both conditions increased their cumulative earnings over time, thus 
confirming H3. However, the difference between the two conditions did not change 
across the five blocks, which means that H4 was not supported. Such evidence is in line 
with previous work by Garcia and colleagues (2006) and Garcia and Tor (2007), 
showing that rankings increase competition. This is particularly important in the context 
of Experiment 2, as participants in both conditions were consistently close to relevant 
standards, the top and the bottom of the rankings respectively. Participants ranking 2nd 
strove to be the top ranked, irrespective of being consistently better than the average. 
Similarly, participants always second-last increased their cumulative earnings over time 
in order to improve their status. This behavior is also in line with previous work on goal 
setting and risky behavior (see Locke & Latham, 1990; Ordóñez, et al., 2009), 
suggesting that when people fall short of relevant goals are more likely to engage in 
unethical behaviors to succeed. One possible explanation to account for participants’ 
behavior across both experimental conditions is based on the loss aversion assumption 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Individuals ranking 2nd consistently fell below the 
reference point, namely, the top of the rank, and perceived their outcomes in the 
negative domain. For this reason they might have gone greater lengths to be the best 
performers in the group. Similarly, second-last participants tried not to lose their 
standing and rank at the very bottom of the group. Understanding the specific 
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motivations that drove individuals’ tendencies to improve their wealth over time goes 
beyond the purpose of this work, and it is yet not clear whether participants ranking 
second-last were motivated not to lose their standing (avoid being the last ranked) or 
were indeed driven by upward comparisons and aimed to the top of the ranking. 
Experiment 2 does not provide direct measures to answer this question. However, 
research based on multiple reference points, such as aspiration and survival (March & 
Shapira, 1988), could provide useful insights on participants’ behavior.  
 Interestingly, Experiment 2 revealed that participants in both conditions had a 
tendency to claim a significantly higher reward when the lower payoff matrices were 
displayed in the last block compared with the first. I believe that this measure of 
cheating did not affect my main hypotheses. More specifically, on average, second last 
and second best participants maximized their outcomes in 6.25 and 5.92 matrices out of 
7 ambiguous trials presented in each block. Conversely, they pressed the high payoff 
button in .99 and 1.04 matrices out of the 7 containing the triangle. Further analyses 
revealed that the tendency to choose the higher payoff button was significantly different 
across the three types of matrices, F(2, 78) = 209.98, p < .001, η2partial = .84. In 
particular, planned comparisons showed that the difference between ambiguous 
matrices and matrices containing a triangle was significant in every block (p < .001 for 
all comparisons). Although the little amount of cheating observed might suggest a 
switch toward the adoption of a different strategy to increase one's ranking, the 
significantly greater tendency to take advantage of ambiguous trials compared to the 
unethical behavior observed in Experiment 2 is in line with H3.  
 Experiment 2 showed that providing participants with their exact position within 
a group of similar others direct second-best participants’ attention towards the 
comparison in which they are worse off rather than towards the comparison in which 
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they are better off (Boles & Messick, 1995). Following the core assumption of the 
social comparison processes theory (Festinger, 1954), results showed that upward 
comparisons are more salient and exert greater influence in driving participants’ 
economic behavior (Boyce et al., 2010). Taken together, the results of Experiment 2 
seem to confirm that when people are provided with their exact position in a group, they 
are less likely to adopt aggregate comparisons, even when such comparisons 
communicate that they are among the best achievers. Furthermore, it is worth noting 
that being consistently a high status individual is not sufficient to lessen the disposition 
to exploit unclear scenarios to increase one’s earning over time. In fact, not only 
rankings prompted competition among second-best and second-last participants, but 
they also showed that individuals lied a bit when trying to reach the top.  
 Experiment 2 extended the findings emerged in Experiment 1, showing that 
rankings increase competition, especially in proximity to relevant standards. 
Furthermore it highlighted the importance of relative comparisons, revealing that when 
specific others are present, aggregate comparisons are not longer adopted (Buckingham 
& Alicke, 2002). Importantly, Experiment 2 seemed to suggest that the precision of 
feedback about one’s position in a relevant group could enhance the saliency of relative 
comparison, and increase competitive behaviors. The goal of Experiment 3 is to directly 
compare the effect of aggregate and relative feedback among high status participants, 
and test whether the perceived precision of one’s standing could account for 
individuals’ economic behavior.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Above the Average vs. Always First 
 
 
 
7.1 Method 
7.1.1 Participants. 39 students participated in the experimental task (50% female; 
mean age 23 ± 3 years). As in Experiment 2 the experimental session lasted about 30 
minutes. 
 
  7.1.2 Materials and procedure. Procedure and stimuli were identical to 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions. In the ‘above the average’ condition, participants received 
feedback at the end of each block informing them that they their scores were 
consistently higher than the average score of a group of students who underwent the 
same task in a previous session. In the ‘always first’ condition participants received 
feedback at the end of each block informing that they were consistently 1st in a group of 
five students who underwent the same task in a previous session. The purpose of this 
manipulation was two-fold. First, it aimed to explore the pursuit of wealth among high 
status individuals. Second, it allowed for a direct comparison between aggregate and 
relative feedback about one’s performance over time in a group of similar others. 
Neither Experiment 1 nor Experiment 2 provided direct measures of the possible 
mechanisms underlying individuals’ tendency to increase their earnings over time. Yet, 
Experiment 2 showed that providing more precise information about participant’s 
standing compared to other peers (ranking) prompted both second-best and second-last 
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participants to exploit loopholes in the game to increase their wealth. Further, 
Experiment 2 revealed that when exploiting grey areas is not enough, cheating 
represents a possible strategy to maximize one’s outcome. To this purpose, Experiment 
3 tested whether the perceived precision of the feedback about one’s standing could 
explain why people strive for greater wealth over time. At the end of the experimental 
session participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all precise) to 7 (very precise), how precise they perceived the information about their 
position in the group at the end of each block.  
 Due to budget constraints, Experiment 3 adopted a slightly different reward 
system. More specifically, participants were informed that they would participate in a 
lottery where only 6 students would be selected at random to win an amount of money 
based on their performance on the task. Similar to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
participants were informed that those who achieved an average earning above the cut-
off value of €7.5 would gain €10, whereas those who had an average performance 
falling below the cut-off of €7.5 gained €5. As in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the 
experimenter left participants alone in the laboratory for the duration of the computer 
task.  
 
7.2 Results  
 7.2.1 Amount of money earned across blocks 
 Figure 3 shows the average amount of money earned across the 5 blocks. A 2 
(condition: above the average vs. always first) X 5 (blocks) analysis of variance with the 
amount of money earned across 5 experimental blocks as the dependent variable 
revealed a significant interaction between blocks and condition, F(4, 148) = 5.33, p < 
.001, η2partial = .13, whereas the effect of blocks was only marginally significant (p = 
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.052), indicating a lower amount of money earned in the block 5 compared to block 1 (p 
< .05). To explore the interaction, separate analyses for each condition were conducted. 
The main effect of blocks did not reach significance among participants scoring 
consistently above the average, (p = .32). The same analyses revealed a main effect of 
blocks among participants ranking always first, F(4, 72) = 5.59, p < .001, η2partial = .23, 
and planned comparisons showed a significant tendency to reduce the amount of money 
in blocks 4 and 5 compared to block 1 (p < .05 for each comparison). Lastly, a main 
effect of condition emerged, F(1, 37) = 9.11, p < .05, η2partial = .20, showing that 
participants ranking as always first earned a significantly higher amount of money 
across blocks than participants consistently ranking above the average (respectively, M 
= 7.42, SD = .41, M =6.84, SD = .70). 
 
 
Figure 3. Amount of money (in Euro) earned across the five experimental blocks 
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 As shown in Table 4, contrast effect between conditions revealed that 
participants ranking always first earned a significantly higher amount of money in 
blocks 1, block 2, and 3 compared to participants in the above the average condition, 
t(37) = -3.65, p < .05, t(37) = -2.41, p <.05, and t(37) = -3.24, p <.05, respectively. 
 
Table 4. Amount of money earned by participants in the two experimental conditions 
across the five blocks of Experiment 3. 
 
Blocks Above the average Always First 95% CI 
 M  SD M SD LL UL 
Block 1 6.69 .85 7.94 1.25 -1.94 -.55 
Block 2 7.02 .55 7.41 .43 -.71 -.06 
Block 3 6.81 .69 7.35 .29 -.89 -.20 
Block 4 6.85 .97 7.20 .35 -.84 .12 
Block 5 6.87 .99 7.13 .49 -.78 .25 
 
 
 7.2.2 Ambiguous trials 
 I conducted a 2 (condition: above the average vs. always first) X 5 (blocks) 
analysis of variance with the number of times participants chose the button associated to 
the higher payoff when presented with ambiguous trials as dependent variable to 
investigate whether the tendency to exploit ambiguous situations varied across 
conditions. Results showed that the main effect of the blocks and the interaction 
between blocks and condition did not reach significance (F < 1, p >.58). 
However, the main effect of condition emerged, F(1, 37) = 4.20, p < .05, η2partial = .10. 
Results showed that participants ranking as always first chose the button associated to 
the higher payoff to a greater extent than participants performing consistently above the 
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average (respectively, M = 6.53, SD = .49, M =5.76, SD = 1.56). Although the 
interaction between blocks and condition was not significant, I ran exploratory analyses 
to investigate when, over time, participants in the two experimental condition differed 
in their tendency to exploit ambiguous situations. Contrast effects across conditions 
were marginally significant, revealing a higher tendency to maximize the payoff in 
block 1 (p = .053), block 3 (p = .055), and block 4 (p = .06) among always first 
individuals, compared to participants above the average (Table 5).   
 
Table 5. Number of times participants chose the higher payoff button when presented 
with ambiguous trials in the two experimental conditions across the five blocks of 
Experiment 3. 
 
Blocks Above the average Always first 
 M  SD M SD 
Block 1 5.60 1.93 6.53 .61 
Block 2 6.00 1.29 6.49 .60 
Block 3 5.90 1.55 6.65 .58 
Block 4 5.60 2.03 6.53 .61 
Block 5 5.70 2.08 6.47 .69 
 
 
 
 
 7.2.3 Unethical behavior 
 I ran the same analysis with the number of times participants chose the button 
associated to the higher payoff when presented with matrices containing the triangle as 
dependent variable. Results showed the main effect of blocks, F(4, 148) = 3.41, p < .05, 
η2partial = .08, as indicating significant lower unethical behavior in block 3 compared to 
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block 1 (p < .05).  The interaction between blocks and condition was significant, F(4, 
148) = 6.8, p < .001, η2partial = .16. In order to explore the nature of the interaction I ran 
separate analyses for each condition. Results showed a significant effect of blocks 
among participants ranking above the average, F(4, 76) = 5.07, p < .001, η2partial = .22), 
showing greater unethical behavior in block 2, 4 and 5 compared to block 1: 
respectively, t(19) = -2.85, p <.05 for the comparison between block 1 and block 2, 
t(19) = -2.66, p <.05 for the comparison between block 1 and block 4, and t(19) = -2.66, 
p <.05 for the comparison between block 1 and block 5. The same analyses were carried 
out for participants ranking always first, revealing a main effect of blocks, F(4, 72) = 
4.87, p < .05, η2partial = .21, and lower unethical behavior in blocks 3, 4 and 5 compared 
to block 1: respectively, t(18) = 2.18, p <.05 for the comparison between block 1 and 
block 3,  t(18) = 2.50, p <.05 for the comparison between block 1 and block 4, and t(18) 
= 2.47, p <.05) for the comparison between block 1 and block 5.  
Lastly, the main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 37) = 8.58, p < .05, η2partial = 
.18, indicating greater unethical behavior among participants ranking always first 
compared to participants consistently scoring above the average (respectively, M = .77, 
SD = .83, M = .20, SD = .27). As shown in Table 6, participants always first cheated 
more than participants above the average in blocks 1, t(37) = -3.01, p < .05, block 2 
t(37) = -3.22,  p <.05, and block 3, t(37) = -4.13, p < .05.  
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Table 6. Number of times participants chose the higher payoff when presented with the 
matrices containing the triangle in the two experimental conditions across the five 
blocks of Experiment 3. 
 
Blocks Above the average Always First 95% CI 
 M  SD M SD LL UL 
Block 1 0 0 1.79 2.7 -2.99 -.58 
Block 2 .30 .48 .74 .73 -.83 -.04 
Block 3 0 0 .47 .51 -.71 -.24 
Block 4 .35 .59 .42 .61 -.46 .31 
Block 5 .35 .59 .47 .69 -.54 .29 
 
 
 7.2.4 Further analyses 
 I carried out the same ANOVA with the number of times participants chose the 
key associated to the higher payoff when presented with matrices containing the square 
as dependent variable. No main effect of blocks and condition was found (respectively, 
p = .21 and p = .40) and the interaction between blocks and condition did not reach 
significance (p = .23).  
 
 7.2.5 Mediation analysis 
 I hypothesized that rankings provide more detailed and precise information about 
a participant’s standing in the group, and that this, in turn, should prompt individuals to 
earn a higher amount of money. In order to further investigate this relationship, I first 
tested whether participants always first reported a higher perceived precision compared 
to those above the average. Results showed that the perceived precision difference was 
significant, F(1, 38) = 10.39, p < .05, η2partial  = .21, indicating that participants always 
first perceived the information about their standing as more precise than did participants 
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above the average (respectively, M = 6.11, SD = 1.44, M = 4.60, SD = 1.46). Following 
Hayes and Matthews (2009), I then ran a mediation analysis to test whether the 
perceived precision of the feedback about participants’ standing mediated the 
relationship between different ranking condition and the tendency to increase the payoff 
over time. The effect of condition was reduced to non-significance (coeff = .28, [SE = 
.09], p < .05, to coeff = .19, [SE = .10], p = .065), when the perceived precision of the 
feedback was entered in the model, and higher perceived precision was associated to a 
greater tendency to increase the payoff in the 5 experimental blocks (coeff = .11, [SE = 
.07], p = .08). A bootstrap analysis showed that the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
interval for the indirect effect excluded zero [.01, .20], thus indicating full mediation.   
 
 7.3 Discussion 
 
 The purpose of Experiment 3 was to compare participants’ tendency to increase 
their cumulative earnings over time when the opportunity to exploit ambiguous 
situations was present. Furthermore, Experiment 3 was designed to test whether this 
behavior differed across two experimental conditions in which participants either 
received aggregate feedback informing that they were consistently better than the 
average, or relative feedback, informing that they were consistently ranking 1st in a 
group of other 4 students. The second goal of Experiment 3 was to test possible 
explanations of individuals’ economic behavior over time.  
 Results showed that participants who were able to see their exact position within 
a group and ranked consistently 1st earned on average a higher amount of money at the 
end of the 5 experimental blocks, although this tendency slightly decreased in the last 
two blocks. Such evidence is in line with previous work by Garcia and colleagues 
(2006) and Garcia and Tor (2007) showing that the mere presence of rankings increase 
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competition. Yet, my results are innovative as they provide evidence that competition 
arises not only in proximity to a relevant standard, like for participants ranking second 
in Experiment 2, but also when individuals consistently occupy the first position in the 
ranking, whereas participants above the average settled for an overall lower amount of 
money. This pattern is similar to the one observed in Experiment 1, when the wealth of 
participants above the average did not change (except for the last block in which their 
earnings decreased) across blocks. These results support H5 and are in line with 
previous work by Buckingham and Alicke (2002), showing that aggregate comparisons 
represent a diagnostic source of information only when specific others are not present. 
On the other hand, participants ranking 1st were not only better than the average, but 
also the top performers in the group. Experiment 3 does not provide direct measures to 
better understand what drove their economic behavior, and future research should 
explore which reference points these individuals adopted.  
 Results regarding the tendency to maximize the monetary outcomes when 
presented with ambiguous matrices revealed that this disposition did not vary over time 
across conditions. Yet, again, participants always first, on average, chose the highest 
payoff in 6.50 out of 7 ambiguous trials, compared to 5.70 times out of 7 for 
participants scoring above the average thus providing a partial support of H5. 
Furthermore, exploratory analyses revealed that the exploitation of ambiguous matrices 
resembles the same pattern observed in the amount of money earned, thus lending 
stronger support for my prediction. Yet, I acknowledge that future research should 
adopt a greater sample size and a higher number of ambiguous matrices, as this can 
increase the variance in participants’ responses and strengthen the hypothesized effect.  
 Although the main effect of condition suggested that, on average, participants 
always first cheated more than those scoring above the average in the first three 
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experimental blocks, the pattern over time across conditions is more difficult to 
interpret.  While participants above the average did not exhibit unethical behavior in 
Experiment 1, in Experiment 3 these individuals increased their unethical choices across 
blocks. This pattern, although significant, reversed for participants ranking always first.  
It is important to notice that Experiment 3 adopted a reward system based on a lottery. 
At the beginning of the computer task, participants were informed that only 6 students 
would be selected at random to win the amount of money based on their performance. 
This difference with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 could have made unethical 
behavior more tolerable as individuals might have perceived the reward less real. In this 
case they could have felt less guilty of cheating. Although I understand that the new 
reward system may have had an impact on the results in Experiment 3, it is unlikely to 
have affected the main hypothesis of this study. In fact, H5 received partial support and 
the differences were in the right direction and the reward system was the same for 
participants in both conditions. Yet, future studies should control for the perceived 
probability of winning as covariate, so as to provide stronger support for this line of 
inquire.  
 However, it is very important to notice that many of the effects showed above 
regarding the average amount of money earned, the likelihood of choosing the higher 
payoff when presented with ambiguous matrices, and the amount of unethical behavior, 
seem to be driven by what participants ranking 1st do in the first experimental block. 
One may argue that such evidence could seriously affect my data and hypotheses, as 
being responsible for the marginally significant interaction reported above. 
Furthermore, it is also important to notice that participants in both conditions received 
the first feedback at the end of the first block, so on the one hand the difference in the 
first block cannot be explained by the experimental manipulation, but, on the other 
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hand, is problematic because participants should have shown a more similar 
performance in that block. To the purpose of better exploring the efficacy of my 
manipulation, and the strength of H5, I conducted further analyses excluding the first 
experimental block, in order to confirm my predictions. 
 As for the average amount of money earned over time, I conducted a repeated 
measure ANOVA with the amount of money earned in blocks 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
dependent variable. Although the main effect of blocks and the interaction between 
condition and blocks did not reach significance (p > .15), the main effect of condition 
was significant, showing a higher average amount of money earned by participants 
always first (M = 7.27, SD = .31) compared to participants above the average (M = 6.8, 
SD = .71), (F(1, 37) = 4.81, p <.05, η2partial = .12).  
 The same analyses were carried out for the number of times participants chose 
the higher payoff when presented with ambiguous matrices. Resembling the same 
pattern observed when all the five blocks were considered, the main effect of blocks and 
the interaction between blocks and condition did not reach significance (F < 1, p >.47). 
Yet, the main effect of the condition was marginally significant (p = .06), showing that 
individuals ranking always first exploited the ambiguous trials to a greater extent than 
those above the average (respectively, M = 6.53, SD = .54, M = 5.8, SD = 1.56). 
Finally, I performed that same ANOVA with the number of time participants claimed 
the higher payoff when presented with the low payoff matrices. The main effect of the 
blocks was significant, F(3, 111) = 2.82, p < .05, η2partial = .07, as to testify lower 
unethical behavior in block 3 compared to block 1 in both conditions (p < .05). The 
interaction between blocks and condition was marginally significant, F(3, 111) = 2.27, p 
= .08, η2partial = .06. Separate analyses revealed a significant effect of blocks among 
participants scoring above the average, F(3, 57) = 3.89, η2partial = .17, and lower 
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unethical behavior in block 2 compared to block 1 (p <.05). On the contrary, the main 
effect of blocks did not reach significance among participants ranking always 1st (p = 
.18). Lastly, the main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 37) = 4.16, p < .05, 
η2partial = .07, showing, on average, greater unethical behavior among participants 
ranking always first compared to those scoring simply above the average (respectively, 
M = .53, SD = .41, M =.25, SD = .34).  To summarize, the previous analyses based 
only on the last 4 blocks support H5 in the hypothesized direction. Several factors might 
have affected participants’ behavior in the first experimental block including the 
different reward system based on a lottery adopted in Experiment 3. Unfortunately, I did 
not introduce a manipulation check to assess whether the instructions regarding the 
payoff were fully understood by participants, and future research should take this last 
point into account.  
 Lastly, Experiment 3 provided a possible explanation of participants’ economic 
behavior over time. More specifically, it suggested that more precise information about 
one’s standing in a relevant group explains different possible strategies adopted to 
maximize the payoffs among participants ranking above the average and always first. 
Results confirmed H6, and showed that when the perceived precision of feedback was 
entered in the regression model, the condition was no longer a significant predictor of 
people’s behavior. This is important for two reasons. First, it shows that participants’ 
status is not always relevant in predicting the pursuit of wealth, and second, it reveals 
that people are willing to exploit the ambiguity (and to a lower extent behave 
unethically), because they are provided with more precise information about their status 
in a group of similar others. While previous research shed light on the proximity to 
relevant standards and different goal orientation as factors able to trigger competition 
(Garcia & Tor, 2007; 2009; Poortvliet et al, 2009), the present results provide a direct 
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measure to define the boundary condition under which the maximization of outcomes 
occur over time.  
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Chapter 8 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 Goal of the present work was to explore the effect of feedback on individuals’ 
tendency to accumulate wealth and increase social status over time. More specifically, 
the main purpose was to assess whether different sources of information about how 
people performed compared to others affected their disposition to exploit situations in 
which it was possible to maximize the monetary payoff without breaching any rule. The 
role of similar others is important, as it provides diagnostic information about how 
abilities, skills, and opinions fare with those of peers, friends or colleagues at work. For 
instance, a soccer player can compare with a teammate to assess his skills, and a 
researcher looking for a position may perceive herself as competitive or not according 
to the number of her publications and that of other applicants. The mechanism of 
comparing to others in order to ascertain the validity of one’s opinions or skills is the 
core assumption of Festinger’s theory of social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954), 
which represents the main theoretical support of this work. According to this approach, 
and its more recent developments, individuals compare spontaneously and oftentimes 
unintentionally to others (Gilber, Gisler, & Morris, 1995) to obtain stable evaluations 
about themselves on important dimensions. Comparisons may occur either upward 
(when individuals choose better others as reference points) or downward (when 
individuals choose worse others as reference points). The direction of the comparison is 
important, as it does not only affect evaluations, but also self-esteem and self-efficacy 
(see Collins, 1996; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Suls et al., 2002). Thus, it derives that being 
among the best performers, or achievers, has positive repercussions on people’s 
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contentment and well-being. In this work I aimed to explore another dimension of 
comparison, namely, the individual’s economic status, and its interaction with different 
ways to communicate participants their standing within a group of peers. I believe that 
this represents an important process with real social implications. People are 
accustomed to look at other members of their group when trying to evaluate their assets, 
and, at least in Western societies, wealth represents one of the most powerful signal of 
social status, tracing the boundaries between upper and lower class individuals, and 
triggering mechanisms of self and other categorization (Kraus et al., 2011). Many 
scholars already explored the relationship between social comparisons and wealth, yet, 
their work mainly focused on how economic status affected well-being (Hagerty, 2000) 
and on the role played by relative and absolute income on happiness (Boyce et al., 
2010). To my knowledge, no previous work has been done to understand the effect of 
different sources of comparison, relative and absolute, on people’s desire to acquire 
higher status in an economic scenario in which it was possible to choose either a higher 
or a lower monetary payoff across ambiguous situations. The ambiguity of the scenarios 
built across Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3 is another important 
innovative contribution of this work. Standard economic approach (Von Neaumann & 
Morgestern, 1944) suggests that people should always maximize their outcomes, in 
order to get maximum utility and reward. This should hold particularly true in the 
context of this work. No specific rule on how to answer the ambiguous trials was 
provided, and participants were free to choose the higher reward without breaching any 
rule. Yet, as the three experiments revealed, individuals did not always maximize their 
gains, showing that other contextual factors affected their actions (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). In this work I controlled for one of the factors that can influence 
individuals’ behavior, namely, the nature of the social comparison. Across three 
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experiments I showed that providing more or less detailed information on how a 
participant was performing compared to similar others affected her disposition to earn a 
higher or lower amount of money, and under some circumstances, her motivation to lie 
in order to acquire a higher status (see Experiment 2 and Experiment 3). 
 Experiment 1 represented the first step, and explored the role of aggregate 
feedback on individuals informed that they were consistently better or worse than the 
average. By doing so I was able to compare the economic behavior of high and low 
status participants when they were free to interpret the ambiguity in the most favorable 
manner. The theoretical support for Experiment 1 was based on recent developments of 
Festinger’s theory. Results showed that when no other specific individuals are present, 
aggregate sources of information are more diagnostic, and communicate that someone is 
either among the best (high status) or the worst (low status) individuals in the group. As 
suggested by previous work by Festinger (1954) and Manis and Paskewitz (1984), 
participants scoring below the average adopted upward comparisons and increased their 
motivation to reach their richest peers, thus displaying a significant tendency to choose 
the higher payoff when facing ambiguous trials. On the contrary, as suggested by Boyce 
and colleagues (2010) and Hagerty (2000), high status participants might have 
experienced greater satisfaction and well-being from standing among the best achievers, 
which in turn might have prompted to exploit ambiguous trials to a lower extent.  
 Experiment 2 extended the findings emerged in Experiment 1, and assessed 
whether having a high standing is enough to reduce people’s tendency to increase their 
status over time. The goal of Experiment 2 was to introduce different ranking conditions 
(second-best and second-last) and to control for the effects of relative comparisons. This 
last point is relevant, as on many occasions people can compare their performance to the 
one achieved by others in the same reference group. For instance, a student can compare 
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her grade in a test to those of other students, or a car seller can see how many cars she 
was able to sell over a semester compared to those sold by her colleagues. In the 
economic and organizational domain it is not rare to observe the pervasiveness of 
rankings. Magazines such as Forbes or Fortune regularly list the richest men (Forbes 
400) and firms (Fortune 500) in the United States. In the educational setting students 
can assess the quality of their school by checking its standing among the best 
institutions. Furthermore, ranking shift the reference points people adopt when 
assessing their status. That is, a person can be richer than the majority of other peers, 
but at the same time can perceive herself as poorer than someone who has an even 
higher status. Experiment 2 was built on previous work by Garcia and colleagues 
(2006), and Garcia and Tor (2007; 2009), demonstrating that rankings increase the 
motivation to outperform others and enhance competition. Experiment 2 revealed the 
strength of relative comparisons, and showed that being consistently above the average 
is not sufficient to limit the pursuit of wealth, when at the same time, an individual is 
falling short of the top of the ranking. Interestingly, results of Experiment 2 support the 
claim by Garcia and Tor (2007), showing that competition among peers increase both in 
proximity to the top and the bottom of ranking. Lastly, Experiment 2 revealed that 
participants ranking 2nd cheated in the last experimental block in order to increase their 
earnings. Although I did not explicitly test what drove participants’ behavior, it is seems 
reasonable to argue that when the exploitation of ambiguous trials was not enough, 
individuals lied in order to reach the top.  
 The fact that also second-last participants cheated is intriguing. Yet, it is not clear 
the rationale behind such behavior. A future experiment to shed light on such finding is 
needed. For example, it could be interesting to ask second-last participants at the end of 
each block what is the goal they aim to achieve in the next block, whether it is the 
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motivation not to lose their status and avoid being the last ranked, or the motivation to 
increase their status to be among the best performers. Building on previous work by 
March and Shapira (1992) on the existence of survival and aspiration reference points, 
it is possible that second-participants would do their best in order to avoid being the last 
ranked in the group.     
 While Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 allowed for a comparison between high 
and low status participants over time they neither a) directly compared the effects of 
aggregate and relative feedback, nor b) provided a possible explanation for individuals’ 
behavior. To this purpose, Experiment 3 was designed to compare high status 
individuals (above the average and always first) across two different feedback 
manipulations (aggregate vs. ranking). Experiment 3 theoretical background was based 
on ranking theory (Garcia et al., 2006). Results concerning participants ranking above 
the average resembled a similar pattern as Experiment 1, where participants above the 
average earned a lower amount of money only in the last experimental block. On the 
other hand, participants always first, not only exhibited a greater tendency to choose the 
higher payoff when two different reward options were available, but also cheated to a 
greater extent in order to get a higher reward at the end of the experiment.  
 At this point I believe it is important to recognize that the cheating behavior 
emerged in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 represents an unexpected finding, and that 
the means across conditions are quite low. One may argue that instead of deliberately 
lying, participants committed an error in pressing the wrong button of the keyboard. 
While this explanation might be reasonable, I have reason to believe that the unethical 
behavior was a deliberate action instead. The stimuli presented on the screen were 
visible and clear (a matrix measured 100mm on each side), and ample time (1500ms) 
was given to participants before the software moved on to the following matrix. 
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Furthermore, if unethical behavior is actually due to an error, it should be equally 
distributed in the two conditions, yet results clearly showed that this was not the case.  
It is true though that the reward system in Experiment 3 might have affected 
participants’ disposition to lie, thus being responsible for the different pattern observed 
among participants above the average in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3. To this 
purpose a future experiment should be designed to further explore unethical behavior. 
For instance, it could be interesting to increase the number of low payoff matrices and 
decrease the number of high payoff matrices. By doing so participants may be more 
motivated to lie when they realize that following the rules will not guarantee a high final 
reward. Research already demonstrated that when people don’t deal with real money but 
with a medium of exchange (i.e. tokens), they are more likely to engage in unethical 
behavior (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). This is because such mediums make the moral 
implications less salient. Although the parallel with Experiment 3 is not straightforward, 
it is possible that, the reward system based on a lottery, made participants experience 
less guilt, given that the chance of winning ‘dirty’ money was relatively small. 
 An important finding of Experiment 3 is represented by the significant result of 
the mediation analysis. While Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 lacked of measures 
capable to explain when or why people tried to increase their wealth over time, 
Experiment 3 revealed a possible process underlying the effect of social feedback on 
participants’ disposition to exploit ambiguous situations. More specifically, results 
showed that the precision of the information about one’s standing explains the different 
behavior between aggregate (above the average) and relative (always first) social 
comparisons. We expect to observe the same results when comparing participants above 
the average and always 2nd, yet, future research is needed to confirm this assumption. 
This evidence is important as no previous work on rankings identified the boundaries 
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conditions under which people are more likely to compete, and to a lower extent, to lie. 
Similar to what I said for Experiment 2, Experiment 3 would benefit from future 
research investigating which benchmark participants always ranking first adopted. For 
example, asking them whether their goal was to improve their score compared to others, 
or to improve their personal performance compared to the previous block could be 
useful to better understand their economic choices.  
 
8.1 Future directions 
 One of the limits of this set of studies is that it would be important to better 
understand whether people are moved by the desire to beat others, and improve their 
status in the group, or by the desire to improve on the previous block result. Of course 
there are several ways to investigate this research question. For instance, participants 
ranking 4th among five could be threatened by the possibility of being the worst 
performers in the group. Similarly, participants always first might have been worried to 
lose their rank and end in second place. This is because they had clear information about 
their scores and those of others. Put it simply, they could clearly view the score of the 
participant right above and below them. This was not possible in the context of 
Experiment 1, where participants were simply informed that they were scoring above or 
below the average. The difference among Experiment 1 and Experiments 2 and 3, is that 
individuals could identify a possible threat to their standing.  
 Previous work by Loewenstein (1996) revealed that people draw more meaning 
from something that is specifically identifiable and vivid. For example, in the field of 
charitable giving, Small and Lowenstein (2003) showed that identifiable victims evoked 
greater sympathy and received more money than did a group of victims, and similar 
results were also obtained by Kogut and Ritov (2005). These results, based on the 
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scope-severity paradox (Nordgren & McDonnell, 2011), can be applied to the context 
of the three experiments described in this work. For instance, it could be that 
participants receiving feedback simply informing that they were performing better than 
others in their group (unidentifiable threat) would be less motivated to increase their 
earnings over time, showing a lower disposition towards unethical behavior as well. On 
the contrary, those participants receiving specific information about their standing and 
those of others (identifiable threat) should perceive the threat as more vivid (Jenny & 
Lowenstein, 1997; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and this, in turn, should lead them to increase 
their monetary gains and engage in unethical actions to maintain or improve their 
position in the ranking.  
 Another line of research could be adopted in order to identify possible 
moderators of the relationship between different feedback and the exploitation of 
economic grey areas. Future work should investigate which individual traits provide a 
better understanding of the relationship between the saliency of social comparisons and 
self-interested behavior. Crowe and Higgins (1997) suggested that different self-
regulation strategies affect risky behavior. More specifically, these authors 
differentiated between promotion and prevention focus: while the former is linked to 
advancement, growth and accomplishments, the latter entails security, safety and risk 
avoidance behavior. In the context of this work, it could be interesting to study whether 
promotion and prevention orientations would interact with different ranking conditions, 
and, in turn, would account for individuals’ behavior over time.  
 The role of emotions should be taken into account as well. Recent work showed 
that greed and envy mediate the relationship between environmental features and ethical 
behavior (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008). Assessing feelings of 
greed and envy among participants could represent a possible alternative mediator of the 
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relationship between feedback and pursuit of wealth. For instance, it seems reasonable 
to hypothesize that lower cheating would be observed among participants ranking 
always in first position when lower levels of greed and envy are present. On the same 
line, great potential lies in exploring participants’ disposition toward money and wealth. 
To this purpose, work by Yamauchi and Temper (1982) could be important in 
understanding other factors capable to trigger the desire to acquire higher status. 
 Therefore, besides improving the understanding of which cognitive dimensions 
influence people’s behavior depending on different social comparisons, future research 
should also focus on investigating the boundary conditions of the findings described 
here. More specifically, I believe that strong potential lies in investigating whether 
ethical behavior and exploitations of ambiguous scenarios represent intuitive or 
deliberate actions. I believe that the subject investigated in this set of studies would 
strongly benefit from more direct measures capable to shed light on these mechanisms. 
Recent research on time pressure and unethical behavior (Shalvi, Eldar, Bereby-Meyer, 
2012) revealed that cheating represents an immediate response, and honest conducts are 
more likely to be evoked when ample time is given. In the context of the three 
experiments describe here, it is possible that giving no time limits to participants could 
limit their pursuit of wealth and unethical behavior among participants always first. This 
is because having more time to deliberate might make these participants realize that, 
although they are falling short of the top ranked, they are still better than other four 
students.  
 Finally, the amount, though small, of unethical behavior emerged in Experiment 
2 and 3 is worth further investigation, especially because of its presence among 
participants ranking always first. Chapter 3 illustrated the relationship between high 
status, power and corruption (Kipnis, 1972). A broad area of literature supports the 
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negative effects of power on different behaviors. For instance, Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, 
and Galisnky (2008) showed that power leads people to see others as a mean to reach 
personal goals, and Kunstman and Maner (2011) showed that power increases the 
likelihood that people adopt inappropriate sexual behaviors with colleagues and 
subordinates. Based on previous work suggesting the higher ranked individuals are 
more likely to engage in unethical behaviors (Piff et al., 2012), it could be interesting to 
assess the likelihood that power may serve as a factor capable to trigger the pursuit of 
wealth through unethical actions. 
 
8.2 Concluding remarks 
 I believe that, despite the simplicity of the paradigm adopted in the three 
experiments described here, the goal induced by my manipulations might closely 
resemble several dynamics happening in everyday life. While research showed that 
competition causes unethical behavior (Schwieren & Weichselbaumer, 2010), this work 
suggests that it can also lead people to interpret ambiguous situations in a way that 
increases their wealth when no specific rule is provided. My results suggest that this 
tendency is influenced by the level of detail characterizing the information about one's 
ranking, and that when specific others are present, the norm of a comparison group is no 
longer taken into account. Rather, results showed that individuals care about how their 
wealth fare compared to those of specific other peers in a relevant group (Clark & 
Oswald, 1998). Such comparisons, in turn, drive the evaluation of personal assets and 
trigger different economic behavior over time.  
 No one likes to perform worse than someone else, especially when comparisons 
are made within one's own group (i.e. the group of students in our experiments, a group 
of co-workers or a group of neighbors in real life), and the failure to meet expectations 
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and aspirations causes negative feelings (Cherry, Ordóńez, Gilliland, 2003; Ordóńez, et 
al., 2000). Similarly, in the three experiments reported here, obtaining a payoff inferior 
to what referent others have achieved may spoil people's positive self-efficacy and self-
esteem (Collins, 1996; Shah, 2003), and motivate them to improve their position over 
time. The feedback manipulation adopted across the three experiments resembles the 
properties of many outcomes associated to different sub-goals people achieve in their 
everyday life. These outcomes, like partial marks in college examinations, a manager 
level within an organization, or a person’s end-of-year gains, determine how good 
people perceive themselves at the end of a time period in which they tried to reach their 
goals and outperform others. On these basis, a possible implication of these results 
applies to the organizational settings. It is not rare that managers and entrepreneurs 
adopt rankings to provide feedback about the performances of their employees. 
Competition among employees may promote innovation and lead to a better and more 
efficient allocation of resources on the market (Charness, Masclet, & Villeval, 2013). 
Yet, findings from Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 indicate that a possible drawback is 
the higher likelihood of unethical actions, which, on the long run can carry negative 
consequences to the organizations. Finally, this work also provides a contribution to 
social comparison literature. While previous research explored the effect of relevant 
others in mood regulations (Emmons & Diener, 1985; Fox & Kahneman, 1992; Tesser, 
1988), self-evaluations and self-perceptions (Brown et al., 1992; Cash, Cash & Butters, 
1983), and self-esteem (Brown & Gallagher, 1992), here I demonstrated that relevant 
others may also serve as reference points thus influencing aspirations and goals people 
strive to achieve.  
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